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PROVING DISPARATE IMPACT IN
FAIR HOUSING CASES AFTER
INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES
Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin Bradford*
Disparate-impact claims under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)
are now a well-established part of housing discrimination law, having been
recognized for decades by the lower courts and recently endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. The Court in Inclusive Communities
saw the impact theory as a way of bolstering the FHA’s “role in moving the
Nation toward a more integrated society,” but it also set forth certain “cau-
tionary standards” to guard against “abusive” impact claims. Under these
standards, which are similar to those adopted in a 2013 HUD regulation
and those long used in Title VII employment discrimination cases, a FHA-
impact plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s challenged policy causes a
disparate impact on a racial minority or other FHA-protected group, and
then, if the defendant establishes a legitimate interest for its policy, the
plaintiff may still prevail by showing that a less discriminatory alternative
would serve this interest.
In the first stage, Inclusive Communities instructs courts to “examine
with care” the plaintiff’s proof in order to facilitate the “prompt resolu-
tion” of FHA-impact claims before trial. But, apart from the analogy to
Title VII, neither Inclusive Communities nor HUD has provided any gui-
dance for determining what such evidence should entail. Furthermore,
lower-court decisions in FHA-impact cases before Inclusive Communities
rarely followed the Title VII methodology and often used inconsistent tech-
niques in evaluating the relevant data. This Article provides the guidance
needed for evaluating a plaintiff’s proof in this crucial prima-facie-case
stage of a FHA-impact claim.
The Article first reviews the law governing proof in disparate-impact
cases and identifies the data sets available to establish disparate impact in
FHA cases. It then shows how these legal principles and available data
should be used in the most frequently pursued types of FHA-impact claims,
i.e., those involving a landlord’s screening devices and those challenging a
municipality’s restrictions on affordable housing.
Implicit throughout the discussion are two themes: (1) that certain ap-
proaches to proving disparate impact in FHA cases are problematic; and
* Robert G. Schwemm is the Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor at
the University of Kentucky College of Law.
Calvin Bradford is a private consultant who has provided expert testimony on
statistical matters in over sixty fair housing cases (examples are cited infra notes 57,
131, 190, and 199).
We thank Steve Dane and Joe Rich for their thoughtful comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
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(2) that, given the correct legal and statistical principles and the data avail-
able, certain types of housing-impact claims may be harder to prove than
others. Based on these insights, the Article shows that the promise of Inclu-
sive Communities—that FHA-based impact claims may help break down
arbitrary barriers to a more integrated society—will take some serious ef-
fort to fulfill.
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INTRODUCTION
Disparate-impact claims under the federal Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”)1 are now a well-established part of housing discrimination
law. Such claims have been recognized by the lower courts since the
1970s,2 and last year the Supreme Court endorsed these claims in
1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(1968). The FHA, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012).
2. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir.
1974).
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Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc.3
The Inclusive Communities opinion saw the impact theory as a
way of bolstering the FHA’s “role in moving the Nation toward a
more integrated society,”4 but the Court also set forth certain “caution-
ary standards” to guard against “abusive” FHA impact claims.5 These
standards, which are similar to those adopted in a 2013 regulation
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (“HUD”),6 tie the proper handling of FHA impact claims to their
counterpart under the federal employment discrimination law, Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.7 Under these standards, the plaintiff
must prove that a defendant’s challenged policy causes a disparate
impact on a racial minority or other FHA-protected group, and then, if
the defendant establishes a legitimate interest for its policy, the plain-
tiff may still prevail by showing that a less discriminatory alternative
would serve this interest.8
This Article provides guidance for evaluating a plaintiff’s proof
in the first stage of a FHA impact claim. Inclusive Communities in-
structs courts to “examine with care” the proof at this “prima facie
case” stage in order to facilitate the “prompt resolution” of FHA-im-
pact claims.9 Thus, according to the Court, a plaintiff who fails to
produce appropriate statistical evidence faces pre-trial dismissal, per-
haps as early as the pleading stage.10 But, apart from the analogy to
3. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
4. Id. at 2526.
5. Id. at 2524.
6. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (promulgating 24 C.F.R. § 100.500). As the
agency primarily responsible for administering the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a),
HUD’s regulations interpreting the FHA are entitled to substantial deference. See
Meyers v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003) (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
7. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e.
8. See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
9. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
10. See id. at 2523–24. Post-Inclusive Communities decisions dismissing FHA-im-
pact claims at the pleading stage include Boykin v. Fenty, 650 F. App’x. 42, 44 (D.C.
Cir. 2016); Gomez v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 629 F. App’x. 799, 802 (9th Cir. 2015);
Glenn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 3570274, at *6 (D. Md. July 1, 2016);
Cobb Cty. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:15-CV-04081-LMM, 2016 WL 2937467, at
*12–13 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2016); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-cv-3045, 2016
WL 1222227, at *5-7 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No.
14–cv–3045, 2015 WL 5009341, at *9–12 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015); Merritt v.
Countrywide, No. 09–cv–01179–BLF, 2015 WL 5542992, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2015).
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Title VII, neither Inclusive Communities nor HUD has provided any
guidance for determining what such evidence should entail.11 Further-
more, lower-court decisions in FHA-impact cases before Inclusive
Communities rarely followed the methodology used in Title VII cases
and, worse, often used erroneous or inconsistent techniques for evalu-
ating the relevant data.12
Part I of this Article reviews the law governing proof in dispa-
rate-impact cases, noting both Title VII principles and FHA prece-
dents. Part II then identifies the types of data that are available to
establish disparate impact in FHA cases. In Part III, we show how the
legal principles and the data available should be used in different types
of FHA impact claims, dealing primarily with two situations: (A) a
landlord’s screening devices (e.g., refusing to rent to persons with
criminal records or those using Section 8 vouchers); and (B) a munici-
pality’s zoning-based restrictions on housing developments of particu-
lar value to minorities.
Implicit throughout the discussion are two themes: (1) that cer-
tain approaches to proving disparate impact in FHA cases are prob-
lematic; and (2) that, given the appropriate legal and statistical
principles and the available data, certain types of housing-impact
claims will be harder to prove than others. Based on these insights, we
conclude that the promise of Inclusive Communities—that FHA-based
impact claims may help break down arbitrary barriers to a more inte-
grated society—may not always be easy to fulfill.
I.
PRINCIPLES FOR PROVING DISPARATE IMPACT
IN FHA CASES
A. FHA-Effect Law: Distinguishing Disparate-Impact from
Perpetuation-of-Segregation Claims
HUD’s 2013 regulation endorsing discriminatory-effect claims
under the FHA recognized that a challenged practice may have an
illegal effect in either of two ways: “(1) harm to a particular group of
persons by a disparate impact; and (2) harm to the community gener-
ally by creating, increasing, reinforcing, or perpetuating segregated
housing patterns.”13 These two separate theories had earlier been rec-
11. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2526 (remanding without commenting on the
evidence); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. at 11468–69.
12. See infra notes 84–85, 94–97 and accompanying texts.
13. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11469 (describing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2016)).
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ognized by numerous courts,14 which, along with HUD, agreed that a
FHA plaintiff may present evidence supporting both types of discrimi-
natory-effect claims in a single case.15
Historically, most perpetuation-of-segregation claims have been
made against municipal defendants accused of blocking integrated
housing developments in predominantly white areas.16 Unlike dispa-
rate-impact claims, segregative-effect claims may challenge a particu-
lar action or decision of the defendant as well as an across-the-board
policy or practice.17 Statistical evidence is the key to proving both
types of claims, but the focus of this evidence differs, with disparate-
impact claims requiring a comparison of how a challenged policy af-
fects different groups while segregative-effect claims focus on how a
challenged action affects residential segregation in the area.18
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive Communities
endorsed FHA disparate-impact claims, but did not deal with—in-
deed, barely mentioned—the segregative-effect theory.19 Furthermore,
this theory, unlike disparate impact, has no clear analog in Title VII
law.20 This is not to say that segregative-effect claims are now on
shaky ground. To the contrary, based on the 2013 HUD regulation and
Inclusive Communities’ recognition that the FHA is designed to foster
integration,21 such claims have a strong foundation.22 Still, because
14. See cases cited in ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
LITIGATION § 10:7 n.1 (2016).
15. See, e.g., cases cited in id. § 10:5 n.3, para. 1; case described infra note 22.
16. See cases cited supra note 14; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11469 (noting that “the perpet-
uation of segregation theory of liability has been utilized by private developers and
others to challenge practices that frustrated affordable housing development in nearly
all-white communities and thus has aided attempts to promote integration [citing
cases]”).
17. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
18. See cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 14, § 10:5 n.3, para. 1; case described
infra note 22.
19. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–25 (dealing only with the question of
whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA); id. at 2522 (noting
that while the FHA does not “force housing authorities to reorder their priorities,” it
does aim “to ensure that those priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating
discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation”).
20. Cf. Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Signifi-
cance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 273–78 (2004) (describing the undeveloped state
of Title VII law regarding hiring programs designed to create a diverse work force).
21. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22, 2525–26 (recognizing FHA’s goal
of integration); see also id. at 2519, 2522 (citing with approval a prominent perpetua-
tion-of-segregation precedent, Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 937–38 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)).
22. For an appellate decision after Inclusive Communities that upheld a perpetua-
tion-of-segregation claim along with a disparate-impact claim in a FHA-based chal-
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our focus here is disparate-impact claims and the proof needed to sup-
port them, we leave to another day the proof requirements in segrega-
tive-effect claims.23
B. Basic Framework of a FHA Disparate-Impact Claim:
The Three Steps
The standards that govern FHA disparate-impact claims are es-
tablished by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive Commu-
nities and HUD’s 2013 regulation.24 Both use the same basic three-
part burden-shifting framework for these claims, and their articula-
tions of the applicable standards are nearly identical.25
Under both Inclusive Communities and the HUD regulation, dis-
parate-impact cases are to be analyzed in three steps.26 First, the plain-
tiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate impact.27 Second, if the plaintiff proves a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its challenged policy is
“necessary to achieve a valid interest.”28 Third, if the defendant satis-
fies this burden, then the plaintiff may still establish liability by prov-
ing that the defendant’s interest could be served by a policy that has a
less discriminatory effect.29
lenge to a municipality’s blocking of a proposed integrated housing development, see
Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d. 34, 49–50 (2d Cir.
2015).
23. For more on proof regimes in perpetuation-of-segregation claims, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 14, § 10:7.
24. See supra notes 3, 6.
25. The standards are identical except for a slight difference in the wording of the
defendant’s burden in Step Two. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. This slight
semantic variation may not signal any real substantive difference, because both HUD
and Inclusive Communities state that the defendant’s burden here is analogous to the
comparable burden of an employer in a Title VII impact case. See Implementation of
the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11470; Inclu-
sive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23.
26. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2016); Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
27. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1); Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
28. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. The HUD regulation articulates this
burden as the defendant having to prove that “the challenged practice is necessary to
achieve one or more of its substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.” 24
C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2). For more on the standards governing this step, see infra note
49 and accompanying text.
29. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3); Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2515; see also
Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617–19 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding
that prior Second Circuit precedent putting the burden of proof in this step on the
defendant must be abrogated in light of the HUD regulation’s determination to put
this burden on the plaintiff).
According to HUD, the plaintiff’s proffered less discriminatory alternative must
serve the defendant’s articulated interest, “must be supported by evidence, and may
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1. Step One
In Step One, the plaintiff “has the burden of proving that a chal-
lenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory ef-
fect.”30 This requires three elements: (1) identifying a particular policy
or practice of the defendant that is being challenged; (2) showing a
sufficiently large disparity in how this policy affects a class of persons
protected by the FHA compared with others; and (3) proving that this
disparity is actually caused by the defendant’s challenged policy.31
This Article focuses on the statistical proof required in the second ele-
ment—the principles of which are discussed in Part I.C—but we here
briefly describe the first and third elements.
The plaintiff’s first task is to identify a specific neutral policy or
practice used by the defendant to limit housing opportunities.32 Be-
cause disparate-impact claims challenge only generally applicable pol-
icies, this theory is not appropriate for claims that are based on a
defendant’s single act or decision.33 Furthermore, the challenged pol-
icy must be neither discriminatory on its face nor applied in a discrim-
inatory manner, for these situations would present claims of
intentional discrimination.34 A variety of policies and practices have
been challenged in FHA disparate-impact claims, including:
not be hypothetical or speculative.” Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Dis-
criminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11473.
30. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11482.
31. See id. at 11468–69; Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523–24.
32. See, e.g., L & F Homes and Dev., L.L.C. v. City of Gulfport, Miss., 538 F.
App’x. 395, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1038 (2014); Gallagher
v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010); 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v.
District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 680–81 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Tsombanidis v. West
Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 574–75 (2d Cir. 2003); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996); Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83
F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996).
33. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Town of Milan, 559 F. App’x. 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2014); L
& F Homes, 538 F. App’x. at 400–01; Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v.
City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 53 (2d Cir. 2002); Simms, 83 F.3d at 1555; Ventura
Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 318 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827–28 (D. Minn. 2004),
aff’d, 419 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523
(noting that a “one-time decision may not be a policy at all” for disparate-impact
purposes), on remand No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at * 5–7 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2016) (ruling against plaintiff’s impact claim in part because it did not chal-
lenge a specific, facially neutral policy of the defendant); cf. Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d
at 619 (upholding FHA-impact claim, in suit prompted by defendants’ blocking of
plaintiffs’ proposed housing development, as properly challenging a general zoning
“policy” as opposed to a single, isolated zoning “decision”).
34. See, e.g., Gomez v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 629 F. App’x. 799, 802 (9th Cir.
2015); Larkin v. State of Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 289–90 (6th Cir.
1996); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1500–01 (10th Cir. 1995); see
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• residency preferences and similar techniques used by housing
officials and private landlords to favor people with local ties
over “outsiders”;35
• screening devices used by landlords to limit units based on ap-
plicants’ source of income, citizenship status, prior criminal re-
cord, or other criteria that disproportionately harm minorities
or people with disabilities;36
• exclusionary zoning and other land-use restrictions that limit
housing proposals of particular value to racial minorities or
people with disabilities;37
also Reg’l Econ. Cmty., 294 F.3d at 52–53 (noting that disparate-impact analysis “ex-
amines a facially neutral policy or practice” and plaintiffs must be challenging “out-
wardly neutral practices”).
This is not to say that it would be inappropriate for a FHA plaintiff to pursue
both disparate impact and intentional discrimination (“disparate treatment”) claims in
the same case—see, e.g., Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11470 (noting that a FHA “plaintiff may bring a
claim alleging either or both intent and effect as alternative theories of liability”)—but
only that the court in such a case should deal with each of these claims according to
its own proper analytical framework. See, e.g., Ave. 6E Inv., L.L.C. v. City of Yuma,
818 F.3d 493, 503–13 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 295 (2016) (analyzing
intent and impact claims separately in FHA-based exclusionary zoning case). Accord-
ing to the Bangerter opinion: “A disparate impact analysis examines a facially-neutral
policy or practice, such as a hiring test or zoning law, for its differential impact or
effect on a particular group. Disparate treatment analysis, on the other hand, involves
differential treatment of similarly situated persons or groups.” Bangerter, 46 F.3d at
1501 (quoting Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
933 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)); cf. Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (noting, in housing
discrimination case based on the Equal Protection Clause, that disparate-impact evi-
dence would be relevant in proving intentional discrimination).
35. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Justice Ctr. v. Edgewater Park Owners Co-op., Inc., No. 10
CV 912(RPP), 2012 WL 762323, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012); Langlois v.
Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 56–64 (D. Mass. 2002); United States v.
Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 729–32 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
36. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248–51 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing source of income); L.C. v. Lefrak Org., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 391, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing source of income); Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee,
835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1194–97 (M.D. Ala. 2011), vacated as moot on other grounds
by Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Comm’r, No. 11-16114-CC, 2013 WL 2372302 (11th
Cir. May 17, 2013) (discussing citizenship status); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Sec-
tion 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing propor-
tion of income to rent).
37. See, e.g., Ave. 6E Inv., 818 F.3d at 509–13 (discussing national origin); Mhany
Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 616–20 (discussing race and national origin); Huntington Branch,
844 F.2d at 936–41 (discussing race and national origin); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–88 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing race); cases cited in
SCHWEMM, supra note 14, § 11D:5, n.21 (discussing disability).
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• mortgage practices that result in less favorable treatment of mi-
norities or minority areas;38
• home-insurance standards that result in minorities being treated
less favorably;39 and,
• occupancy restrictions that disproportionately harm families
with children.40
Step One’s third element is causation; that is, the plaintiff must
show that the proven statistical disparities are actually caused by the
policy being challenged.41 This will be easy in many cases. For exam-
ple, causation is obvious when a landlord denies a unit to the plaintiff
based on its policy of refusing to rent to tenants who, say, use govern-
ment vouchers or have too many people in their household.42 Some
cases, however, may present difficult causation issues.43 An example
is Inclusive Communities, where the Supreme Court expressed some
skepticism about whether the plaintiff there could show “a causal con-
nection between the [defendant’s] policy and a disparate impact—for
instance, because federal law substantially limits the [defendant’s] dis-
cretion.”44 As this statement implies, if factors other than the defen-
38. See., e.g., Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 50 F. Supp. 3d 300, 318–20
(E.D.N.Y. 2014); Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 CV 7667(HB), 2013 WL
3835198, at *8–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571
F. Supp. 2d 251, 255–59 (D. Mass. 2008).
39. See, e.g., Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 600 F.3d 1205, 1207–09 (9th Cir. 2010), as
amended en banc (Apr. 30, 2010); Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 113
F. Supp. 3d 555, 571–72 (D. Conn. 2015).
40. See, e.g., R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110 (D.R.I.
2015); Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D. Conn.
2011); Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 317–19
(C.D. Cal. 1994); cases cited infra note 47.
41. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., R.I. Comm’n, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 127 n.25. Causation will also be
easier to prove if the plaintiff’s statistical evidence focuses on proper comparison
groups. See Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 577 (2d Cir. 2003)
(noting, after identifying the proper comparison groups, that “[s]uch a comparison
identifies the handicap and allows for a causal analysis between the claim of discrimi-
nation based on the handicap in question and the facially neutral policy”). For more
on the need to focus on proper comparison groups, see infra notes 62–63 and accom-
panying text.
43. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–24 (2015) (noting that “a plaintiff challenging the deci-
sion of a private developer to construct a new building in one location rather than
another will not easily be able to show that this is a policy causing a disparate impact
[in part] because . . . of the multiple factors that go into investment decisions about
where to construct or renovate housing units”). On remand, the trial court ruled
against the plaintiff’s impact claim, in part because of the absence of this causation
element. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs,
No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *8–9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016).
44. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
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dant’s challenged policy have caused the statistical disparities
identified, then the plaintiff’s prima facie case would fail.45
2. Steps Two and Three
If a plaintiff prevails in Step One, Step Two requires the defen-
dant to prove that its challenged policy is needed to advance a legiti-
mate interest.46 Some defendants in FHA-impact cases have
succeeded in carrying this burden,47 while others have failed.48 Taken
together, the cases show only that each case is unique, and HUD has
made clear that this issue “requires a case-specific, fact-based
inquiry.”49
If a defendant satisfies its Step Two burden, the plaintiff may still
prevail in Step Three by proving that the defendant’s interests “could
be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”50
For purposes of this Article, the most interesting part of Step Three
will be proving that the suggested alternative is less discriminatory,
45. See also Quad Enters. Co., LLC v. Town of Southold, 369 F. App’x. 202, 206
(2d Cir. 2010) (noting, in affirming defeat of impact claim, that “[s]imply proffering
evidence that there is a shortage of handicapped-accessible housing in the Town of
Southold compared to its handicapped population does not show that the neutral pol-
icy at issue is the cause”); Edwards v. Johnston Cty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215,
1223 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting, in affirming dismissal of impact claim, that plaintiffs
only alleged statistical disparities and not also that defendants’ challenged policy af-
fected the groups compared unequally). For recent decisions that have dismissed
FHA-impact claims for failing to adequately allege causation under Inclusive Commu-
nities, see Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394, 412 (Mass.
2016); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045 SRN/JJK, 2015 WL 5009341, at
*10 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045 (SRN/
SER), 2016 WL 1222227, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016).
46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. This has been particularly true in occupancy-standard cases. See Pfaff v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 747–50 (9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side
Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1254–57 (10th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Hillhaven Corp., 960 F. Supp. 259, 263 (D. Utah 1997);
United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 830-31 (D. Nev. 1994).
48. See, e.g., Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 741–42
(8th Cir. 2005); Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315,
318–19 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724
F. Supp. 148, 155–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
49. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11470; see also id. at 11471 (referring to this issue as “fact-specific” and
one that “must be determined on a case-by-case basis” and is “very fact intensive”).
Thus, HUD has declined to endorse any “examples of tenant screening criteria such as
rental history, credit checks, income verification, and court records that would be
presumed to qualify as legally sufficient justifications.” Id.
50. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3). For more on the standards governing this step, see
supra note 29.
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i.e., data must be presented showing that the disparate impact here is
less than in Step One.51
C. Principles and Problems in the Statistical Proof of Impact
1. Basic Principles
Assuming that a facially neutral policy is identified,52 the plain-
tiff must present statistical evidence showing that this policy has a
greater impact on a protected class than it does on others.53 Perhaps
because FHA-impact claims have challenged a variety of different
policies and practices,54 courts have eschewed any single test for eval-
uating statistical evidence in housing cases,55 instead requiring only
that the plaintiff “offer proof of disproportionate impact measured in a
plausible way.”56 Still, enough appellate decisions have ruled on the
adequacy of the plaintiff’s evidence in these cases to establish “certain
guidelines.”57
51. See, e.g., infra notes 242–47 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty
for a plaintiff who has challenged a landlord’s rule barring tenants with a criminal
record in proving that a narrower exclusionary rule would be less discriminatory).
52. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 382–85 (3d Cir. 2011); Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d
1201, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2008); Khalil v. Farash Corp., 277 F. App’x. 81, 84 (2d Cir.
2008); Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir.
2006); 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673,
680–81 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565,
575–78 (2d Cir. 2003); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 1995); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983, 987–88 (4th Cir. 1984). While some opinions have stated that “there may be
cases where statistics are not necessary,” Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 576, these state-
ments have invariably been made in dicta as part of a holding that the plaintiff’s
evidence failed. See, e.g., Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 577 (quoting Gamble v. City of
Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 307 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997)); Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83
F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996).
54. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d at 382; Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F.
App’x. 581, 585 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Hallmark Developers, 466 F.3d at 1286);
Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Imple-
mentation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11468 (“Whether a particular practice results in a discriminatory effect is a fact-spe-
cific inquiry. Given the numerous and varied practices and wide variety of private and
governmental entities covered by the Act, it would be impossible to specify in the rule
the showing that would be required to demonstrate a discriminatory effect in each of
these contexts.”). HUD specifically noted that its regulation was not designed “to
describe how data and statistics may be used in the application of the [impact] stan-
dard” nor did it provide “a codification of how data and statistics may be used in the
application of the standard.” Id. at 11468.
56. Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d at 382.
57. Hallmark Developers, 466 F.3d at 1286.
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These guidelines include four requirements. First, the plaintiff’s
statistics must focus on “the subset of the population affected by the
challenged policy.”58 This affected population will vary depending on
the nature of the case. For example, if the defendant’s policy is being
challenged for demolishing or causing evictions in a particular hous-
ing complex, only those persons residing therein would be affected.59
On the other hand, if the challenged policy is a landlord’s screening
device or a municipality’s blocking of a proposed development, a
much larger group is affected (e.g., all persons who make up the po-
tential market for this housing).60 Even in a single case, the affected
group may vary depending on whether the challenged policy has both
a future impact (e.g., who will live in this project in the future) and a
backward-looking impact (e.g., who was injured in the past as a result
of this policy).61
Second, within the affected population, the plaintiff’s statistics
must focus on “appropriate comparison groups” in order to show how
the challenged policy hurts a protected class more than others.62 It is
not enough to show a policy’s negative impact on a protected class
(e.g., that the policy blocked a housing project for disabled persons).
The plaintiff must also show that others were less harmed by the pol-
58. Reinhart v. Lincoln Cty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Hall-
mark Developers, 466 F.3d at 1286–87 (holding that “the appropriate inquiry is into
the impact on the total group to which a policy or decision applies”).
59. See, e.g., appellate cases described infra note 86 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 70; Hallmark Developers, 466 F.3d at 1286–87
(citing various FHA decisions in support of the proposition that the affected-popula-
tion focus here should be on those area residents eligible for subsidized housing). For
more on the problem of defining the proper local housing market, see infra Part
I.C.2.a.
61. Cf. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 64 (D. Mass. 2002)
(focusing on different affected groups depending on whether the relief sought looks
forward (e.g., injunctive relief) or backward (e.g., damages)).
62. See Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 576–77 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding, after noting that disparate-impact claims require a proper comparison
between two groups showing that the defendant’s policy imposes a greater impact on
a protected class, that the plaintiffs’ proof failed because they improperly compared
disabled versus non-disabled persons instead of recovering addicts versus all others);
see also Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff’s proof inadequate because it used
inappropriate comparable groups); Hayden Lake Recreational Water & Sewer Dist. v.
Haydenview Cottage, LLC, 835 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980–81 (D. Idaho 2011) (relying on
Tsombanidis in holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact by focusing exclusively on how defendant’s policy impacted two facilities for
disabled persons without also showing how that policy impacted similarly situated
facilities for non-disabled persons).
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icy. It is disparate impact, not just impact, that the FHA is concerned
with here.63
Third, the statistical comparison should generally show the rela-
tive percentages of protected versus non-protected class members af-
fected by the policy, as opposed to the absolute numbers of the groups
affected.64 To illustrate why absolute numbers are not the proper fo-
cus, consider the example of a “No Criminal Record” policy imposed
by a landlord in a heavily white area (e.g., Boise, Idaho): given the
area’s demographics, this policy might well screen out more whites
than blacks in absolute numbers, but this fact would not be probative
of whether the policy has a disproportionate impact based on race
(e.g., the percentage of blacks with criminal records might well be
higher than that of whites in the area).65
Finally, the disparity in the relative impact on the two groups
must be sizeable. Courts have made clear that the FHA, like Title VII,
only bars practices with “significant” discriminatory effects,66 and nu-
63. See generally Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 577 (noting, before ultimately holding
plaintiffs’ impact proof inadequate, that: “In this case, plaintiffs might have been able
to meet their burden by providing statistical evidence (1) that x% of all of the [pro-
tected-class members] in West Haven need (or have good reason) to live in the ‘group
settings’ prohibited by the facially neutral fire regulations at issue, (2) that y% of all
of the [non-protected-class members] in West Haven need (or have good reason) to
live in such group settings prohibited by the fire regulations, and, crucially, (3) that x
is significantly greater than y.”).
64. See, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2011); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 844 F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Dews v.
Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 565 (N.D. Tex. 2000); see also supra note
63 (describing Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 577).
65. Assume that in Boise—a city with a population of about 207,000, of whom
89.0% (84,230) are white and 1.5% (3,105) are black—100 blacks and 1000 whites
have criminal records and thus would be excluded by this policy (i.e., far fewer blacks
than whites are excluded). Search Results for Boise, Idaho, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/16/1608830.html (last visited Nov.
12, 2016). Still, blacks would be disproportionately excluded, because the policy
would screen out 0.0322% of Boise’s blacks (100 ÷ 3105 (3105=1.5% of the total
population)) and 0.0054% of its whites (1000 ÷ 184,230 (184,230=89.0% of the total
population)); that is, blacks would be excluded at a rate of nearly six times that of
whites (i.e., 0.0322% ÷ 0.0054% = 5.96). For an additional example, see Appendix A.
In certain special circumstances, using absolute numbers along with percentages
may be helpful in evaluating a FHA-impact claim. See Appendix A.
66. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1217 (11th Cir.
2008); Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2008); Rein-
hart v. Lincoln Cty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007); Charleston Hous. Auth. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 740–41 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Oti Kaga, Inc. v.
S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir.2003)); Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at
575; Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996);
Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Southend Neigh-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\19-4\NYL403.txt unknown Seq: 16  6-JAN-17 14:11
700 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:685
merous FHA decisions have held that the evidence did not show a
large enough disparity to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof.67 For
more on this significant-size requirement, see infra Part I.C.2.c.
2. Problems
a. Local-Versus-National Data and Identifying the Relevant
Housing Market
Although a few FHA-impact cases have been brought against na-
tional mortgage providers and home-insurance companies,68 the vast
majority have challenged policies of landlords, housing officials, or
municipalities that operate only in a local area.69 As a result, courts
have generally found statistical evidence of impact to be more persua-
sive when it relates to the particular apartment complex, agency, or
municipality whose action is being challenged, or at least the metro-
politan area where the defendant operates, as opposed to national
data.70 According to an influential 1995 Tenth Circuit opinion that
rejected the use of national data to support an impact claim against a
local housing provider, statistical evidence in such cases should gener-
ally focus on “the narrowly defined area in question.”71
borhood Imp. Ass’n v. St. Clair Cty., 743 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1984); cases cited
infra note 67.
67. See, e.g., Ungar v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 363 F. App’x. 53, 55–56 (2d Cir.
2010); Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x. 581, 585 (11th Cir. 2009); Bonvil-
lian v. Lawler-Wood Hous., LLC, 242 F. App’x. 159, 160 (5th Cir. 2007); Arthur v.
City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 1986); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 14,
§ 10:6, n.20 (citing numerous other FHA cases in which the plaintiff’s statistical proof
of impact was held inadequate).
For cases holding that the plaintiff’s evidence did show a large enough disparity
to establish a prima facie case, see cases cited infra notes 99–100.
68. See cases cited supra notes 38–39 and infra note 131.
69. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 70–72, 77.
70. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
929 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (focusing on statistics for the
defendant-town and that town’s existing housing projects); City of Toledo, 782 F.2d at
576 (relying on census data for low-income households eligible for the proposed pro-
gram in Toledo); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1060–65 (4th Cir. 1982)
(discussing racial distribution of the defendant-town and its surrounding county);
Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982) (focusing on the challenged
practice’s impact on the racial-group percentages in Los Angeles); Resident Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3rd Cir.1977) (focusing on racial discrimination in
Philadelphia and in the area served by the Philadelphia Housing Authority).
71. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d
1243, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing cases). According to the majority opinion in
Mountain Side:
In this case, the appropriate comparables must focus on the local housing
market and local family statistics. The farther removed from local statis-
tics the plaintiffs venture, the weaker their evidence becomes. There is no
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This view has led some courts to borrow a concept from Title VII
law and opine that, if a particular housing project is involved, its “ap-
plicant flow” data should be used.72 However, unlike employment
cases where race-based information on actual applicants and those se-
lected and rejected may be available,73 such “applicant flow” data are
rarely available in housing cases.74 In most FHA cases, plaintiffs have
only been able to provide statistics on the housing market surrounding
the particular project.75
Defining the proper local housing market has proved surprisingly
difficult in FHA-impact cases. First, there is no well-accepted under-
standing of the geographic size for such a market,76 and different
dispute about the veracity of the [HUD] Secretary’s finding of discrimi-
natory effect on the national level. However, this national level discrimi-
natory effect . . . is so far removed from the local arena that it is of little
weight in our analysis.
Id. at 1253. The dissent criticized this approach, finding it appropriate to rely on
national statistics absent evidence showing that the defendant’s market was dramati-
cally different from the national average. Id. at 1257–58.
72. See Bonasera, 342 F. App’x. at 585 (“[S]tatistics based on the general popula-
tion [should] bear a proven relationship to the actual applicant flow.”) (quoting Hall-
mark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006)); see
also Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 938 n.11 (noting that Title VII case law “re-
quires some showing that statistics based on the general population bear a proven
relationship to the actual applicant flow”).
73. See, e.g., Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145–47 (9th Cir. 2002), as
amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (July 18, 2002); Bullington v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1313–14 (10th Cir. 1999). See generally RAMONA L.
PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION: USING STA-
TISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 207 (2013) (noting that, in Title VII
impact cases, “courts have expressed a preference for actual applicant data, when
unbiased and available”).
74. Some government-assisted housing programs do maintain race-based data. See
infra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. However, private landlords, unlike their
employer-counterparts under Title VII, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, are
not required to keep, much less make public, data on the race or other protected-class
status of residents or applicants. Indeed, if a private landlord were discovered to be
identifying applicants by race, this might be seen as evidence of its likely engagement
in intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 372 F. Supp. 1322,
1324 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff’d, 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).
75. The purpose of identifying a particular local housing market is to help generate
appropriate data on existing residential patterns to analyze those groups affected by a
defendant’s challenged policy. The size of a chosen market area needs to be large
enough to encompass a significant representation of the residential patterns for all of
the groups used in the analysis. This, in turn, requires consideration of the individual
conditions involved in a particular case.
76. For example, HUD, in setting fair market rents for its Section 8 programs, has
historically defined market areas geographically by using metropolitan areas and
nonmetropolitan counties, but has recently determined that it may be more appropri-
ate, in some circumstances, to use smaller areas (e.g., ZIP codes). See Establishing a
More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair Market Rents in
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courts have chosen to look at areas as small as a few census tracks to
as large as an entire metropolitan region or even a state.77 Second, the
market for a particular project is affected by the rents or prices it will
charge.78 These are not trivial matters. The size of the disparate impact
attributable to a defendant’s action may vary substantially with the
geographic area chosen.79 Further, data on the protected-class
demographics of a particular geographic area may simply not exist.80
In these uncertain circumstances, a plaintiff may have to offer
evidence about several alternative market areas and try to show that a
disparate impact exists in all of these. FHA cases do make clear that if
“applicant flow” or other narrowly defined data are not available, then
area population statistics may suffice, at least if these two measures
appear to be related.81 And if a FHA plaintiff can show that “applicant
flow” and local data are not available, then national statistics may be
used.82
Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, 81
Fed. Reg. 80567 (Nov. 16, 2016).
77. See, e.g., Hallmark Developers, 466 F.3d at 1286–88 (choosing to focus, in
challenge to county’s rejection of a large development with affordable housing, on
only a few census tracts surrounding the development rather than larger areas such as
Fulton County or the entire Atlanta metropolitan area); R.I. Comm’n for Human
Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110, 125 & n.22 (D.R.I. 2015) (using state-wide data
based on the large size of defendant’s development and evidence that residents came
from “all over”); Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 12,
16–17 (D. Conn. 2011) (citing Second Circuit precedents approving the use of city-
wide data in determining to rely, in challenge to landlord’s occupancy policy, on data
for the city where defendant’s property was located rather than the property’s census
tract); cf. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269 (1977) (noting,
in housing discrimination case based on the Equal Protection Clause, that the dispa-
rate impact of the defendant’s action might be evaluated by comparing the racial com-
position of plaintiffs’ proposed project to that of the overall Chicago metropolitan
area).
78. For examples, see infra Part III.B.
79. Generally, the smaller the area chosen, the smaller the disparate impact. See,
e.g., Hallmark Developers, 466 F.3d at 1286–88 (showing that impact’s size is much
lower in the few-census-tracts area chosen than in the larger areas offered by the
plaintiff).
80. For examples, see infra Part III.
81. See supra note 72.
82. See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[i]n some cases national statistics may
be the appropriate comparable population,” but opining that “those cases are the rare
exception”); cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (holding in Title VII
case that where “there was no reason to suppose” that local and national statistics
differed markedly, it was appropriate for the district court to rely on national statistics
to conclude that defendant’s practice has a disparate impact).
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b. Alternative Comparative Methodologies
Courts in FHA-impact cases have used a variety of methodolo-
gies—which may produce strikingly different results—in comparing
how a challenged policy affects protected versus non-protected clas-
ses. One clearly appropriate approach would be to follow Title VII
law,83 which often focuses on statistics showing that a job test is
passed by a relatively smaller percentage of plaintiff’s protected class
than by the non-protected group (e.g., among those otherwise quali-
fied, 50% of blacks versus 90% of whites pass the test).84 This exact
method has not been used in FHA cases, however, because it is usu-
ally impossible to find race-based data on actual applicants for a de-
fendant’s housing.85
A variation on this method that has been used in FHA cases is to
focus only on the group of persons disqualified by the challenged pol-
icy and show that this group includes a greater percentage of protected
versus non-protected class members (e.g., 50% of blacks versus 10%
of whites are excluded by the policy). For example, in one of the earli-
est appellate decisions to uphold impact-based proof against a private
landlord, the Fourth Circuit in 1984 held that disparate impact was
established by statistics showing that the defendant’s policy resulted in
eviction notices being sent to 54.3% of its nonwhite tenants but only
14.1% of the white tenants.86
Another comparative method used in FHA impact cases is to
show that the proportion of the protected class adversely affected by
the challenged policy is higher than their portion of the overall popula-
83. See supra note 25.
84. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 73, § 5:6 (describing this
methodology).
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987–88 (4th Cir. 1984). Other
appellate decisions employing this method include Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Ac-
tion, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a
prima facie case of disparate impact was established by data showing that 22.54% of
African-American households and 32.31% of Hispanic households would be affected
by the challenged housing demolition, compared to only 2.73% of white households);
Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 734, 741–42 (8th Cir.
2005) (affirming finding that defendant’s planned demolition of low-income housing
units, almost all of which were occupied by African-Americans, “established a dispro-
portionate impact on minority class members whether we examine the relevant wait-
ing list population, the income-eligible population, or the actual Charleston Apartment
Tenants”); see also Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F.
Supp. 2d 563, 567 (E.D. La. 2009) (finding disparate impact, in decision cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522, where
defendant’s moratorium on multifamily housing construction reduced the supply of
rental units in the area in which 51.7% of blacks resided versus 25.0% of whites).
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tion (e.g., 50% of those adversely affected are black while blacks
make up only 10% of the local population). Such a comparison mea-
sures how the defendant’s policy contributes to an “under-representa-
tion” of the protected class living in the area.87 In FHA cases, this
method has been held by some appellate courts to satisfy the plain-
tiff’s initial burden,88 although most of these cases have involved chal-
lenges to municipal restrictions on affordable housing that allegedly
perpetuated segregation.89
For disparate-impact claims, this method has some drawbacks.
First, because it only compares measures involving the protected class,
it does not address whether there is a disparate impact vis-à-vis the
non-protected class. To show a disparity, an additional set of compara-
ble measures for the non-protected class would have to be identified;
for example, in a rental case where 50% of black potential renters are
87. In other civil rights contexts, this has sometimes been referred to as “dispropor-
tional representation.” See, e.g., Julia Lamber et al., The Relevance of Statistics to
Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553, 590–92 (1983).
88. See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that de-
fendant-City’s policy of aggressive housing code enforcement that allegedly de-
creased the supply of affordable housing opportunities was shown to have a
disproportionate adverse impact on African-Americans based on census data showing
that approximately 61% of the population seeking such housing was African-Ameri-
can while African-Americans made up only 11.7% of the City’s population); Smith v.
Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1060–61, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding, in a chal-
lenge to defendant’s withdrawal from low-income housing authority, that a prima fa-
cie case was shown where 56% of all poverty-level families were African-American
and 69.2% of all African-American families were eligible for low-income housing,
but African-Americans made up only 40% of the general population); see also Ungar
v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 363 F. App’x. 53, 55–56 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding against im-
pact-based challenge to defendant’s tenant selection plan where plaintiffs’ religious
group, which accounted for 2.4%–5.0% of the selected tenants, were not shown to be
underrepresented because their percentage of the overall applicant pool was not
shown); Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 90–91 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that plaintiffs failed to allege that the private defendant’s rental policy
“has resulted in or predictably will result in under-representation” of plaintiffs’ relig-
ious group); cf. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269 (1977)
(noting that the impact of the defendant’s decision “does arguably bear more heavily
on racial minorities” because they constituted 40% of the group of low-income per-
sons harmed in the area versus 18% of the overall area population).
For opinions seeming to endorse both this “under-representation” method and
other methods (e.g., the one identified earlier supra note 86 and accompanying text),
see Reinhart v. Lincoln Cty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229–32 (10th Cir. 2007); Hallmark
Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006); Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per
curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33,
57–58 (D. Mass. 2002).
89. As noted above, this perpetuation-of-segregation theory is a well-recognized
method of establishing FHA liability, but it is different from the disparate-impact
theory. See supra Part I.A.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\19-4\NYL403.txt unknown Seq: 21  6-JAN-17 14:11
2016] PROVING IMPACT 705
disqualified by the challenged policy versus blacks accounting for
10% of all renters, it would be necessary also to show that the propor-
tion of whites disqualified by this policy versus their part of the whole
rental market is lower (e.g., 50% of white potential renters are disqual-
ified versus whites accounting for 90% of all renters). Second, unlike
the earlier-described methods, this method’s results will vary depend-
ing on the number and size of different minority groups in the area.90
In addition, the basic theory of this method may produce anomalous
results in some small-number situations.91
A variation on this method may be used when the case challenges
a change in the defendant’s policies (e.g., a landlord’s imposition of a
more restrictive credit-score policy). Here, the comparison focuses on
the proportions of the protected class affected before and after defen-
dant’s implementation of the change (e.g., the share of all black rent-
ers disqualified before the change was 20% while this figure rises to
50% after the change). As in the method previously described, it
would be necessary here to compare these differences to those of the
non-protected group (e.g., to show that whites are less affected by the
change).
A final comparative methodology used in some FHA cases is to
show that the proportion of protected-class members adversely af-
fected by the challenged practice is higher than the proportion of all
persons in the general population adversely affected (e.g., while only
10% of the entire population is adversely affected, 50% of this ad-
versely-affected group is black). Some FHA appellate decisions have
accepted such proof,92 but all involved challenges to municipal actions
that allegedly reduced the area’s supply of affordable housing.
90. Appendix B provides a further explanation and demonstration of this
phenomenon.
91. Consider the example of a landlord who rents only to professional basketball
players. This policy would, indeed, satisfy the method described in the text, because it
would exclude an overwhelming proportion of the black population (over 99%, de-
spite blacks constituting little more than 10% of the overall population). However, it
would not have a disparate impact on blacks because, presumably, the policy would
also exclude an even higher percentage of the white population. See, e.g., Reinhart,
482 F.3d at 1230 n.2 (noting that, where a challenged practice eliminates a lower
percentage of the protected class than of the non-protected class, this is “hardly a
disparate impact on the protected group”).
92. See Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 834 (noting the plaintiff’s showing that 52% of
minority-headed renter households were income-qualified for affordable housing,
compared to 32% of all renter households); Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 938
(holding that challenged zoning decision that prevented affordable housing had a sub-
stantial adverse impact where 24% of African-American families needed subsidized
housing compared to only 7% of all Huntington families).
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The FHA methods described in this section have one common
element: all start with a base pool of data on persons who are other-
wise qualified for the housing involved, and the differences in the
comparison groups used are geared to the particular type of claim
presented. The point here is not that one method is right and the others
wrong, or even that these are the only methods that might be used, but
rather that courts have chosen them because they appear to fit the spe-
cific cases being litigated. Whatever situation is presented, the key to
sound disparate impact analysis is picking a comparative method or
methods that suit the particular claim and facts of the case.
c. The “Significant” Disparity Requirement: Selection-Versus-
Rejection Rates
The first approach identified in the previous section as used in
FHA cases relies on the same basic methodology generally used in
Title VII-impact cases, which compares the percentage of protected-
class members (e.g., blacks) who pass the defendant’s challenged job
test to the comparable percentage of the non-protected class (e.g.,
whites).93 A long used rule-of-thumb in Title VII cases is that if the
resulting ratio of these two percentages is less than four-fifths (0.80),
then the plaintiff’s burden of showing a significant disparity is
satisfied.94
93. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 73, § 5:6 (describing this methodol-
ogy). Focusing on relative selection rates dates back to the Supreme Court’s founda-
tional decision on Title VII impact-based claims—Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971)—whose view that whites fared better than blacks on defendant’s job
requirements was supported by noting the relative pass rates of these two groups. Id.
at 430 n.6; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
(describing the plaintiff’s post-Griggs burden as having to show that “the tests in
question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly differ-
ent from that of the pool of applicants” (emphasis supplied)).
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016) (EEOC’s guidelines originally adopted in
1979; see Adoption of Questions and Answers To Clarify and Provide a Common
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed.
Reg. 11,996 (Mar. 2, 1979)); see also PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 73, § 5:6
(describing the four-fifths rule); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995
n.3 (1988) (describing the EEOC’s adoption of this four-fifths standard as an “en-
forcement rule,” but also noting technical criticisms of this standard and concluding
that it only provides “a rule of thumb for the courts”). Because the four-fifths standard
is just “a rule of thumb,” some courts have found a large enough impact even where
the selection ratio was above 0.80. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 48-
53 (1st Cir. 2014); Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x. 133, 144–48
(3d Cir. 2010). On the other hand, in cases where the affected population is quite
small, the four-fifths rule may unfairly result in a finding of a significant impact. See,
e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimina-
tion, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 783–84 (2009); Eubanks v. Pickens-Bond Const. Co., 635 F.2d
1341, 1347–51 (8th Cir. 1980).
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This approach, which focuses on relative selection rates as op-
posed to relative rejection rates, has occasionally been used in housing
cases,95 but FHA decisions have far more often focused on relative
rejection rates.96 However, the distinction between using selection
versus rejection rates is not important from a methodological stand-
point. Both seek to measure the size of the disparate impact. Further, it
is easy to translate one method’s results into the other’s and therefore
possible to use the equivalent of Title VII’s “four-fifths” rule to mea-
sure the size of the disparate impact shown by comparative rejection
rates in FHA cases.
Using rejection rates would require inversion of the selection-rate
standard, with the plaintiff having to show that the relative disparity
ratio is a higher, instead of a lower, number (i.e., something over 5/4
(1.25) would correspond to the under 4/5 (0.80) standard used for se-
lection rates).97 Appendix C provides a detailed analysis of the mathe-
matical relationship of the selection-rate and rejection-rate methods.
While this methodology is sound, the judicial recognition of the
1.25 standard in FHA cases is limited and certainly does not have
anywhere near the established pedigree that Title VII’s 0.80 standard
does for acceptance rates.98 As far as FHA precedents, all that can be
said is that the major appellate decisions finding a large enough differ-
ence in rejection rates to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden have all in-
volved disparity ratios well above 1.25.99
To illustrate the four-fifths rule: if a job test is passed by 20 out of the 50 black
applicants (40%) and 60 out of the 100 white applicants (60%), the selection ratio for
blacks versus whites is 40%/60% or 0.67, which, being under 0.80, would be low
enough to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of showing a significant disparate impact
against blacks.
95. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2000).
96. See cases cited supra notes 86, 88, and infra notes 98–99.
97. See R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110, 126 n.23
(D.R.I. 2015) (“Based on this application of the inverse of the Four-Fifths Rule, any
disparity ratio [using rejection rates] greater than 1.25 would be defined as having a
substantive disparate impact.”).
To illustrate using similar figures to those in the illustration in note 94 supra: if a
housing policy results in rejection of 30 out of the 50 black applicants (60%) and 40
out of the 100 white applicants (40%), the rejection ratio for blacks versus whites
would be 60%/40% or 1.50, which, being over 1.25, would be high enough to satisfy
the plaintiff’s burden of showing a significant disparate impact against blacks.
98. The one decision we have found that explicitly refers to the 1.25 standard is a
2015 district court opinion where the plaintiff’s evidence showed “extremely large”
disparity ratios of 4.55, 6.92, and 14.25. See R, I. Comm’n, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 126.
99. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658
F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2011) (showing, based on data described supra text accompa-
nying note 86, that the black percentage harmed was over seven times that of whites
(22% versus 3%) and the Latino percentage harmed was over ten times that of whites
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d. Sample-Generated Data, Estimates, and the Problem of
Confidence Levels
As noted above, some housing policies (e.g., those resulting in
evictions) affect only current tenants whose actual demographics may
be identified, thus making application of the statistical principles dis-
cussed in Part I.C.1 a fairly straightforward matter.100 A more typical
situation—and one that involves additional statistical issues—occurs
when the challenged policy (e.g., a landlord’s screening device for
future tenants) affects all those in the market for this housing, thus
requiring an attempt to gauge the demographics of this market.
In the latter type of case, the data available are often based on
samples of the desired population and thus are only estimates of that
population. For example, the U.S. Census may provide the racial
breakdown of the population for a particular city, but most of these
census figures are generated by taking samples of that city’s
population.101
Data based on samples are subject to random error, i.e., the sam-
ple may not accurately represent the actual population studied. To take
account of this random error, statistical tests have been developed that
measure how confident one may be that the sample data accurately
reflect the actual figures.102 Such tests establish a measure of confi-
dence (say, 95%), which shows how probable it is that the sample
(32% versus 3%)); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(showing that the harmed group was 85% black); Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15
(1988) (showing, based on data described supra note 92, that the black percentage
harmed was over three times that of whites (24% versus 7%)); Keith v. Volpe, 858
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (showing that minorities were twice as likely as whites to be
in the harmed group); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010) (described
supra notes 88 and 92); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982)
(showing, based on data described supra note 88, that the black percentage harmed
was almost four times that of whites (54% versus 14%)); and Charleston Hous. Auth.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005) (showing, based on data de-
scribed supra note 86, that blacks accounted for almost all of those affected).
100. See supra appellate decisions cited in note 86.
101. See infra Part II.A. The decennial census is a 100% count of the population and
several other factors.
102. Such tests “come in various technical forms, including multiple regressions, t-
test, Z-tests, the chi-square test, and the Fisher exact test.” Peresie, supra note 94, at
785.
Aside from random error, a sample may have systematic biases. An example is a
telephone survey that only samples households with a land line; because cell phones
are more common for younger households, this flaw may result in a systemic bias
against a representative inclusion of younger households. While the statistical tests
described here can account for random error, they cannot account for these other types
of biases.
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reflects the real population (95% meaning that the range of error in the
sample will include the true value 95 times out of 100).103
For example, in a FHA case that requires data about a city’s ra-
cial make-up, assume that the census data show the city’s population
to be 60% whites, 30% blacks, and 10% others. In order to convey the
real percentages based on these sample-generated figures, it is neces-
sary to calculate a confidence interval for each figure (e.g., the real
value for whites would be 60% plus or minus 4%). This is based on a
standard deviation for that figure (e.g., for whites, one would calculate
a confidence interval that is 1.96 standard deviations above and below
the 60% figure in order to be 95% confident that this 60% figure falls
within a range that includes the real white percentage).104
These concepts, though complicated in theory, have long been
familiar in election polls and television ratings, and they have also
been used for decades in Title VII litigation.105 Courts generally ac-
cept a confidence level of 95% as being statistically “significant.”106
Thus, in the previous paragraph’s example, data showing that whites
account for 60% of the population should be subjected to statistical
tests that produce at least a 95% confidence level. Furthermore, a sep-
arate confidence level must be generated for each of the groups com-
pared (e.g., one for whites and one for blacks). This requires a FHA
plaintiff who is trying to show that a challenged policy harms a greater
proportion of blacks than whites to compare confidence levels of each
103. The range of errors around an estimate vary depending on the size of the sam-
ple: the smaller the sample, the larger the chance of error. See Appendix A for exam-
ples of how these differences affect statistical tests.
For example, data about a large city generated by a 1,000-person sample would
produce a larger range of error than that based on a 10,000-person sample. Both sam-
ples might estimate that the city has 60% whites and 30% blacks, but the confidence
one could have that these are close to the actual values in the population would be
lower for the smaller sample.
104. In round terms, a 95% confidence level corresponds to about two standard devi-
ations, a 99% confidence level to about three standard deviations, and a 90% confi-
dence level to about 1.65 standard deviations. See JOHN E. FREUND & GARY A.
SIMON, MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 312 (8th ed. 1992).
105. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308–11 (1977) (ap-
proving use of such statistical analysis to prove a Title VII violation).
106. See, e.g., id. at 309 n.14, 311 n.17 (opining that a disparity is statistically signif-
icant where it is more than two standard deviations from the expected values (which
corresponds to a 95% confidence level, see supra note 104)).
Note regarding the term “significant”: this section’s discussion of tests that show
whether the data presented is statistically “significant” should not be confused with
the use of the word “significant” in the previous section to determine whether the size
of the disparity ratio shown is large enough to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proving
a prima facie case. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
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group.107 As a rule of thumb, the disparity can be seen as statistically
significant if the confidence levels of the two groups are mutually ex-
clusive (i.e., when graphed, they do not intersect).108
II.
DATA SOURCES FOR PROVING FHA-IMPACT CLAIMS
As noted in Part I’s discussion of legal principles and further
demonstrated in Part III’s application of those principles, it is impor-
tant in each FHA-impact case to determine what is the best data avail-
able to fit the analysis required for that particular case. This Part II
identifies—and describes some of the advantages and disadvantages
of—the most commonly used sources of data for proving these impact
claims. The data sources reviewed here are: (A) two from the Census
Bureau; (B) home-loan data maintained by the Federal Financial Insti-
tutions Examination Council; (C) those available from HUD and local
public housing agencies; and (D) miscellaneous other sources, includ-
ing private records and research aids.
A. Census Bureau
1. American Community Survey (“ACS”)
In older FHA-impact cases, housing data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s decennial reports were commonly used, but more modern
times have seen the Bureau create the ACS, which produces more up-
to-date data during each decade. The ACS offers two basic sets of
tables:
• 1-Year tables that provide annual housing information from a
sample with data for a large number of cities and counties as
well as states, metropolitan areas, and the nation; and,
• merged 3-Year and 5-Year data that include detailed tables at
smaller geographic levels, with the 5-Year tables going down
to the block group level within census tracts.109
107. As noted above, supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text, the most common
method of proving FHA-impact claims is to focus on a simple difference-of-percent-
ages comparison. In other cases, more complex statistical tests may be used, such as
regression equations that control for selected factors. While the statistical tests used
may be different, the concept is essentially the same; that is, statistical significance is
based on measures related to a confidence level around a test value.
108. For an example of this, see infra Part III.A.1.c.i. While this graphing compari-
son of the confidence ranges provides a helpful visualization of the mathematics in-
volved, it is not a valid test of statistical significance. Thus, the actual statistical test
should always be relied on.
109. See FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/
jsf/pages/index.xhtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
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The 1-Year tables have the smallest samples, while the merged 3-Year
and 5-Year tables have much larger samples. The latter thus provide
more reliable details but require adjustments for changes in economic
conditions from year to year, while the single-year tables provide the
most current data but only for larger areas.
These ACS sources can yield more than 2,000 pre-formatted ta-
bles with demographic, financial, and housing data for a single geo-
graphic area. For example, the following table from the 2010-2014
ACS provides data on the employment and disability status of people
in the United States.
ACS Table C18120: Employment Status by Disability Status
Universe: Civilian noninstitutionalized population 18 to 64 years
2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
United States
Estimate Margin of Error
Total: 193,574,369 +/-9,411
  In the labor force: 148,743,241 +/-101,412
    Employed: 135,293,448 +/-119,194
      With a disability 6,632,448 +/-15,301
      No disability 128,661,000 +/-121,990
    Unemployed: 13,449,793 +/-36,423
      With a disability 1,486,847 +/-9,493
      No disability 11,962,946 +/-34,288
  Not in labor force: 44,831,128 +/-105,155
    With a disability 11,583,766 +/-42,503
    No disability 33,247,362 +/-70,967
There are, however, gaps in the ACS data that might limit their
value in some types of FHA-impact cases. For example, there are no
tables:
• with the gender of all household heads by “tenure,”110 a gap
that may be important for gender discrimination cases and for
familial status cases involving female heads of household;
• showing the number of persons in a household combined with
the presence of children, which would be important in familial
status cases such as those challenging occupancy-restriction
policies;111 and,
• with household race/ethnicity information broken down by in-
come and tenure, which may be useful in controlling for in-
come in race/ethnicity cases.
110. “Tenure” here distinguishes renters from homeowners.
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.2.a.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\19-4\NYL403.txt unknown Seq: 28  6-JAN-17 14:11
712 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:685
2. Public Use Microdata Samples (“PUMS”)
PUMS provides samples of the individual respondent’s answers
to over 200 questions, including those dealing with race, ethnicity,
ancestry, citizenship, primary language, income and source, housing
characteristics such as home value or rent, household size, presence of
children, and disability status.112 The 1-Year PUMS provides a 1%
sample of households; the 3-Year PUMS provides a 3% sample of
households from 3 years of merged data with inflation adjustments;
and the 5-Year PUMS provides a 5% sample of households from 5
years of merged data with inflation adjustments. A general description
of the PUMS files and how to use them are found in the “README”
file that accompanies the PUMS data.113
PUMS data can yield almost any kind of breakdown or combina-
tion of breakdowns (cross tabulations) from its data fields. This is es-
pecially helpful when the ACS pre-formatted tables do not provide
what is needed.114 Appendix D contains a list of the subject areas for
the 2014 PUMS.
PUMS data are provided in two sets. One has an individual re-
cord for each household’s housing data, and the other has a record for
each person within the household (for population data). In some types
of FHA-impact cases, the housing and population files need to be
linked together.115
One drawback of PUMS for FHA cases is that, in order to protect
the identity of individual respondents, its smallest geographic area
112. See PUMS Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/data/pums.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (providing links to documents
that list all the variables and codes used in the file—the data dictionary—and defini-
tions of each variable).
113. See id. This document also indicates that estimates from PUMS files are subject
to various random errors due to the complex sampling design. Directions provided by
the Census Bureau for each data set include statistical methods for accounting for the
random errors involved. For an example for the 2015 1-Year PUMS data, see U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, AM. CMTY. SURVEY, ACCURACY OF THE DATA 21–27 (2015), https:/
/www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/accuracy/ACS_Accuracy_of_Da
ta_2015.pdf.
114. The PUMS estimates may differ slightly from those reported in the ACS tables
for the same desired piece of information (e.g., a city’s housing stock). For example,
the estimate for the total number of occupied housing units in Washington, D.C., from
the 2014 PUMS (277,377) is close, but not identical to, the estimate from the ACS
tables (277,378); also, there are some larger variations by different subcategories, and
the ACS data include several thousand rental units where the households do not pay
cash rent. See ACS Tables 25003, 25003B, and 25003H (providing, respectively, the
tenure data for Washington, D.C., as a whole and for black and white households);
2014 PUMS data (providing PUMAs 00101-00105).
115. For an example, see infra Part III.A.1.c.iv.
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available is a Public Use Microdata Area (“PUMA”), which matches
parts of counties or whole counties with at least 100,000 people.116
Thus, PUMAs often do not match city or other local boundaries, as
seen in the following example for Joliet, Illinois.117
B. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) Data
HMDA data, which are administered by the U.S. Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),118 provide individual applicant
records on an annual basis for single-family and multi-family mort-
gage loans. Yearly reports on these elements are required from virtu-
ally every major mortgage lender (excluding only some small
116. For some municipalities that are the central city of a metropolitan area of well
over 100,000 people, one or more PUMAs may match or reasonably approximate the
boundaries of the central city; that is, the PUMAs can be added together to closely
match an entire central city. On the other hand, for many central cities of 100,000 or
more, smaller metropolitan areas, rural areas, and areas outside of the central city of a
major metropolitan area, the PUMA boundaries may not match the boundaries of a
defined housing market so well. This is one reason to use different data sources, such
as the ACS’s preformatted tables, to test whether demonstrated disparate impacts are
dependent upon a particular local geographic area. If they are, the plaintiff’s justifica-
tion for choosing a particular market area will become important. See supra Part
I.C.2.a.
117. For examples of PUMAs that do match city boundaries, see infra Parts
III.A.1.c.iv (Washington, D.C.) and III.B.2.b (Newport News, Virginia).
118. HMDA, which was enacted in 1975 and is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et
seq., was administered by the Federal Reserve Board until the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Title 10, Subtitle H, Section 1094 (1) of
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, transferred this responsibility to the CFPB.
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depository lenders and other lenders that make few mortgage
loans).119 The public may access the HMDA data from two different
government websites.120 These data disclose the individual lender’s
identification, loan amount, high-cost-loan thresholds, geographic-
area identifiers, and selected MSA and census-tract characteristics.
Additionally, HMDA provides data on the loan type, property type,
loan decision, applicant income and characteristics, type of purchaser,
reasons for denial, and other selected data in a coded format.121 Ap-
pendix E contains a HMDA loan-application code sheet.
The HMDA data may be used not only in cases alleging mort-
gage discrimination, but also in some home-sale cases (as demon-
strated in Part III).122 Further, the CFPB has issued regulations
requiring covered lenders to collect additional fields of data beginning
in 2018,123 which should make the HMDA data even more useful in
FHA cases that require assessing race-based access to the home buy-
ing and mortgage markets.124
119. See Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2–1003.3
(2016); see also FED. FIN. INST. REGULATORY COUNCIL (“FFIEC”), A GUIDE TO
HMDA REPORTING: GETTING IT RIGHT (Jan. 2013) and related update letters, availa-
ble at https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/guide.htm (FFIEC is a formal interagency body
empowered to prescribe uniform principles and standards for agencies like the CFPB
that regulate financial institutions). Letters by the Federal Reserve Board for the 2014
data and the CFPB for later years provide updates to the 2013 Guide defining the
asset threshold and lending activities for a covered lender.
120. See HMDA & PMIC Data Products, FFIEC, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/
hmdaproducts.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (providing, through the FFIEC, a series
of HMDA reports for individual lenders and metropolitan areas as well as a version of
the raw HMDA data and a software program to extract the data); Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/hmda/explore (last visited
Oct. 20, 2016) (providing a CFPB website where the public may extract and export
elements of the HMDA data).
121. See Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 12 C.F.R. § 1003.4 (2016); see
also FFIEC, supra note 119.
122. See infra Part III.B.3. Because HMDA data contain the census-tract locations of
loan applications and loans made, they can also be used to identify patterns of racial
or ethnic concentrations in local areas, which might be useful in segregative-effect
cases as well. See supra Part I.A.
123. For the CFPB’s final rule on the additional HMDA data to be collected and its
commentary thereon, see Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 Fed. Reg.
66128 (Oct. 28, 2015). The new data fields include the value of the subject property
and the number of housing units. Some of these elements relate to risk assessment
(e.g., credit scores), while others could produce information on the costs of loans (e.g.,
the fees charged for the loan that are not related to the risk assessment taken into
account in the interest rate itself).
124. However, the CFPB has not yet indicated which of the newly required fields
will be disclosed to the public or in what format. See id., 80 Fed. Reg. at 66132–34.
Using this expanded HMDA data more extensively in FHA-impact claims depends
upon the range and format that the CFPB uses to disclose these new data elements.
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Like PUMS data, HMDA data can be broken down by many dif-
ferent elements. Thus, for example, HMDA data may be used to com-
pare mortgage lenders’ denial rates for minority and white applicants
in a particular market by selected applicant and loan characteristics,125
thereby identifying those lenders that might be targets for further in-
vestigation because their loan decisions have been significantly less
favorable for protected-class members.126 For example, such targeting
can be focused more precisely by comparing groups such as higher-
income blacks and lower-income whites, where higher rejection rates
for blacks would seem less likely, especially if the patterns for an indi-
vidual lender were significantly different than those in the overall
market area.
However, there are gaps in the HMDA data that limit their use in
proving FHA claims. For example, these data do not measure many
characteristics that a lender might legitimately consider in evaluating
applicants (e.g., their indebtedness, assets, employment, and credit
history),127 which means that a showing of race-based disparities in a
lender’s rejections rates cannot alone prove illegal discrimination.128
Further, the HMDA data contain no direct information on the un-
derwriting standards used by lenders,129 which means that a mortgage
provider’s specific policies cannot be identified; this is problematic for
FHA-impact cases, which usually must focus on isolated policies
rather than a lender’s entire underwriting system.130 Thus, even if a
mortgage provider’s denial rates are much higher for blacks than
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126. See Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 389
(2010).
127. Put another way, the HMDA data do not provide detailed information about
evaluating risk. Also, lenders may provide data on a voluntary basis on categories for
the reasons a loan was denied, but the categories are broad and several may be indi-
cated. The CFPB’s recent revision of HMDA disclosure requirements, see Home
Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 Fed. Reg. 66128, will soon mandate report-
ing additional risk-assessment factors such as credit scores, but whether and how this
additional information is made available to the public has not yet been determined. Id.
128. See Schwemm & Taren, supra note 126, at 388.
129. Note, however, that lenders using underwriting standards provided by Federal
Housing Administration (“FHAdm”), VA, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac are bound by
general rules for those loans or required to use particular approved automated under-
writing systems.
130. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. Because underwriting rules and
standards are often proprietary (i.e., they are not made available to the public), a
would-be FHA plaintiff may have a hard time, even at the complaint stage, identifying
a specific policy of a defendant-lender to challenge. In addition, underwriting typi-
cally applies several standards to determine risk, so that one may need to separate out
the effects of different standards. This can be particularly difficult when the provider
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whites compared to other area lenders, the HMDA data could not an-
swer the question of whether this is because of a particular policy, a
set of policies, intentional discrimination, or some other factors. Be-
cause of these limitations, the race-based differences revealed in the
HMDA data have generally been used more to identify specific lend-
ers worthy of further investigation than to establish the elements of a
prima facie case of disparate impact.
For FHA-impact claims, the HMDA data work best when a
lender’s specific policy has been identified and seems unlikely to be
related to the risk of the loan. One example would be a policy against
making loans of less than a certain amount (say, $150,000) in a market
where minority households are more likely than whites to apply for
mortgages below this level.131 Another example would be a lender’s
policy of not providing loans guaranteed by the VA or the Federal
Housing Administration.
C. HUD and Public Housing Agencies
HUD provides a range of data from its own records and research
and from the compilation of reports filed by local housing agencies.
These include: (a) data on area fair market rents and on income limits
for housing-assistance programs; and (b) data on the characteristics of
residents of HUD-assisted housing.132 The latter can be reported for
individual public housing agencies, cities, counties, and states as well
as by individual programs, and include categories for race/ethnicity,
age, gender, and presence of children, as well as income and source of
income data.133 HUD also provides its own version of PUMS data,
although with only 15 pieces of data and the state as the lowest geo-
is using an automated underwriting process that involves complex logistics (some-
times referred to as the “black box” to indicate its lack of transparency).
131. Similar policies imposed by home insurers (e.g., not insuring homes with a
value of under $150,000) might also be the target of FHA-impact challenges, as might
those that decline to insure or provide less coverage for older homes or for landlords
who rent to Section 8 voucher holders. See, e.g., Jones v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of
Am., No. C–13–02390 LHK, 2015 WL 5091908, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2015). The
data sources and the methods reviewed above could be used to assess such impact-
based claims. See also infra III.A.1 (dealing with discrimination against Section 8
voucher holders).
132. See Picture of Subsidized Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http:/
/www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/picture/yearlydata.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2016);
see also Housing Choice Voucher Program, D.C. HOUS. AUTH., http://www.dchous-
ing.org/topic.aspx?topid=2 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) .
133. Some of these data are given in actual counts, while others are in whole per-
centages within a category. Also, some agencies fail to report, or report inconsistent or
partial data.
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graphical level.134 HUD also collects data on the performance of Fed-
eral Housing Administration loans by lender/servicer and area.135
Public housing agencies that administer HUD-assisted programs
often maintain data on their waiting lists that include some demo-
graphic information. While such information is generally not available
from HUD, it may be found in a local agency’s reports or through
Freedom-of-Information-Act requests directed to the agency.136
D. Other Sources and a Suggestion
Other local public records that might be potentially helpful in
FHA-impact cases include foreclosures, building inspections, sewer
and water service records (for access to services), waste sites (for lo-
cation of hazards), and zoning and building codes.
Private entities, including potential FHA defendants, may main-
tain data on such topics as mortgage servicing and foreclosures; multi-
ple listing service records; occupancy records; underwriting standards;
loan origination and servicing files; coded maps; marketing plans;
training materials; and pricing policies.
University-based sociologists and demographers and other pri-
vate researchers have created various types of “segregation indexes,”
which are commonly used to produce a single “score” that shows the
extent of residential segregation in an area.137 Using maps to show
segregation levels has become more common in recent years, as map-
ping software has increased in availability and sophistication;138 map-
134. See Data Sets, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.gov/
portal/datasets (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., OFF. OF PUB. & INDIAN AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
FINAL — PHA Agency Plan: ANNUAL AGENCY PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 (Dec.
30, 2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/FY16-Revised-Final-
Annual-Plan-12-30-15.pdf; Housing Choice Voucher Program, supra note 132.
137. The most common is the Dissimilarity Index, which calculates a value from 0.0
(for perfect balance of racial/ethnic populations) to 1.0 (for total segregation). See,
e.g., Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20 (1993) (describing the “index of dissimilar-
ity” as reflecting “the percentage of blacks who would have to move to achieve an
‘even’ residential pattern—one where every neighborhood replicates the racial com-
position of the city”).
138. See, e.g., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Assessment Tool: Announce-
ment of Final Approved Document, 80 Fed. Reg. 81840 (Dec. 31, 2015) (requiring
local governments that receive certain HUD grants to include, as part of their periodic
Assessment-of-Fair-Housing planning process, a series of demographic maps linked
to different jurisdictions and geographic areas); see also Matthew Bloch et al., Map-
ping Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2015/07/08/us/census-race-map.html (showing demographic maps covering the New
York City area). Such maps for other jurisdictions are also available. See Affirmatively
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ping may be especially revealing when used in conjunction with the
different segregation indexes, although it, too, can show different pat-
terns based on the geographic areas selected.139 These methods of
showing segregation are used primarily in FHA-perpetuation-of-segre-
gation claims, but they may also provide interesting background in
FHA-impact cases.140
Finally, we suggest that those pursuing FHA-impact litigation de-
velop their own data-analysis template (e.g., an Excel workbook) into
which the major public data sources identified in this Part II can be
imported, reorganized, and tabulated. As shown above, each of these
data sources may be helpful—or not—in different types of FHA
claims. Formulas can be generated to select particular data from these
sources, with applied controls for relevant conditions. Other formulas,
and even preformatted tables, can be linked to the group tabulations to
run basic statistical tests. Finally, the data analysis can be re-evaluated
in terms of the checklist for FHA-impact cases set forth at the begin-
ning of Part III to assess the strengths and weaknesses of particular
cases and to be able to respond to anticipated defenses.
III.
APPLICATION
This part applies the principles identified in Part I and the data
sources reviewed in Part II to various types of FHA-impact cases, fo-
cusing on two general situations: (A) a landlord’s screening devices;
and (B) a municipality’s refusal to allow housing opportunities of par-
ticular value to FHA-protected classes. These two types of cases cover
most of the impact-based claims that have been brought under the
FHA.141
Furthering Fair Housing Tool, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://egis.hud
.gov/affht/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
139. In general, the larger the area used, the less clear the racial separations appear to
be. For example, if an entire city with equal minority and white populations is
presented as a single area, there would appear to be no segregation whatsoever, even
though a map of census tracts might show that all the minorities lived in a single part
of the city. The same distortions apply, albeit to a lesser extent, when using smaller
areas such as census blocks, block groups, census tracts, or ZIP codes.
140. See supra Part I.B for a description of the differences between FHA-effect
cases based on perpetuation of segregation and those based on disparate impact.
141. See supra notes 35–37, 40 and accompanying text.
There have been others, particularly in the mortgage and home-insurance areas.
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. To the extent that mortgage lenders
and home insurers seek to avoid the risk of non-payment by providing their services
based on formal underwriting policies, they may be expected to defend their policies
against a FHA-impact challenge by arguing that they reflect legitimate risks posed by
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Whatever the challenged policy is, the basic analytic approach
for all FHA-impact cases follows the same steps. These are to:
• identify the group of persons affected by this policy;
• identify, within the affected group, the protected-class group;
• identify a proper comparison group;
• identify the useful data sources concerning the protected-class
group and the group it is being compared to;
• run the numbers to produce a proper statistical comparison of
these two groups, and test these numbers for statistical signifi-
cance; and,
• determine whether the comparison disfavors the protected class
in a large enough way to establish a significant disparate
impact.
A. Landlords’ Screening Devices
This section deals with a number of screening devices imposed
by housing providers, whether private landlords or public housing
agencies. We first focus on one from the private market: barring per-
sons who use government housing subsidies such as Section 8 vouch-
ers, which may impact minorities more than whites. The same analytic
approach may be applied to other screening rules, and some of these,
including those that disproportionately impact other FHA-protected
classes (e.g., people with disabilities and families with children) are
dealt with in subsection 2.142 Throughout this section, we explore the
use of different data sources and comparative methods, thereby seek-
ing to shed light on the full range of both substantive and technical
issues that a FHA-impact plaintiff should consider in trying to estab-
lish a sound prima facie case.
Virtually all private landlords and public housing authorities do
some screening of would-be tenants. Screening standards often focus
on the applicants’ ability to meet the financial and other requirements
of tenancy, which include not damaging the property or causing
problems with other tenants.143 As noted above in Part I.C.1, if new
applicants. Because such risk-based policies raise special issues not ordinarily en-
countered in FHA-impact cases, we leave their analysis for another day.
142. See infra Part III.A.2.a, b; see also supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text
(dealing with challenges to screening devices that, inter alia, favor persons with local
ties over outsiders and require specified types of income or a certain minimum in-
come-to-rent ratio).
143. See, e.g., CAL. APARTMENT ASS’N, CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS: DECIDING
WHETHER TO ADD CRIMINAL CHECKS TO YOUR SCREENING PROCESS 1 (2005), http://
www.naylornetwork.com/CAA-NWL/assets/documents2/crimi-
nal%20background%20checks.pdf (noting that the goal of all tenant-screening criteria
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screening standards are applied retroactively to current tenants who
are then threatened with eviction, the targeted group is these identifi-
able tenants, and the necessary statistical comparisons discussed in
Part I.C are relatively easy to apply.144 We focus here on the harder
problem of how screening standards apply to future applicants, which
will require statistical evidence about the much larger group of all
potential tenants.
1. “No Section 8” Policy: A Race-Based Challenge
The Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”) program—also called
“Section 8” after the provision in the original 1974 authorizing stat-
ute145—is HUD’s largest subsidy program, serving some 2.2 million
low-income households.146 The HVC program provides these house-
holds with a rent supplement that allows them to access a broad range
of housing choices that they could not afford using just their own
resources.147
Individuals apply for a voucher from the local public housing
authority, which screens them for eligibility,148 and, if they are found
is “to select the resident who is most likely to pay the rent on time and the least likely
to damage the premises or cause problems with other residents”); Evans v. UDR, Inc.,
644 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (noting that landlords’ screening policies
focusing on income requirements are based on concerns that an individual “would
potentially default on the lease by failing to make payments, exposing the landlord to
monetary losses”).
144. See appellate cases cited supra note 86 and accompanying text.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (codifying the relevant portions of the 1974 Housing and
Community Development Act, as amended).
146. See Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_hous
ing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
147. HUD uses data on prevailing rent levels in local markets to set Fair Market
Rents (“FMRs”). See supra note 76. These rents are designed to cover the prevailing
rent levels for all but the top 20% of the rental market, based on unit size. Voucher
holders may rent units that fall within the FMR limits, though there are some limited
exceptions to both the percentage of income a household may pay from its own in-
come and the FMR levels in a particular area. See Housing Choice Vouchers Fact
Sheet, supra note 146.
148. Eligibility for the HCV program depends primarily on household income. HUD
sets income limits based on the number of persons in the household, with the limit for
a household of four persons providing a general measure. HUD also divides eligible
households into two categories. The first is those with incomes less than 30% of the
HUD-defined area median income; these are defined as Extremely-Low Income
(“ELI”) households, and 75% of the vouchers are targeted for them. The second tier is
for households that have incomes less than 50% of the area median; these are defined
as Very-Low Income (“VLI”) households. See generally Housing Choice Vouchers
Fact Sheet, supra note 146. For example, in Washington, D.C. in 2014, the ELI limit
for a four-person household was $31,100, with highest income limit for a household
of eight or more being $42,400; the VLI category for a four-person household was
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qualified, issues them a voucher or puts them on a waiting list (often
necessitated because participating housing authorities receive funding
for only a limited number of vouchers from HUD). Persons who ob-
tain a voucher seek housing on their own, paying not more than 30%
of their income for rent, with the remainder paid for by the voucher.149
Nationwide, voucher holders are disproportionately minorities: in
2013, 48% were black, and 15% were Latino.150 The racial/ethnic dis-
tribution of voucher holders, however, varies considerably across the
country.151
Federal law bars discrimination against voucher holders in cer-
tain government-assisted housing,152 but not by other landlords, and
from the program’s inception, many housing providers have refused to
deal with voucher holders. This “No Section 8” screening device has
been the target of a number of FHA-based impact challenges,153 but
none has resulted in a judicial decision that includes a detailed analy-
sis of whether the plaintiff’s proof established a prima facie case of
disparate impact.154 For purposes of the following illustration, we vis-
$53,500, with the highest income limit for a household of eight or more being
$70,650.
149. See id. (providing general rules and exceptions).
150. See Picture of Subsidized Households, supra note 132.
151. For a report listing the characteristics of voucher holders by individual housing
authority, see OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICI-
PANT AND NEIGHBORHOOD WELFARE 101 app. B-1 (2003), https://www.huduser.gov/
publications/pdf/location_paper.pdf (“Appendix B-1: Age And Race/Ethnicity Of The
HCV Population In Each Of The 50 Largest MSAs”).
152. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv), 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-5(c)(1)(xi) (barring dis-
crimination against voucher holders in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program).
153. See, e.g., Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 F. App’x. 279 (4th Cir. 2008);
Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 508
F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007); Crossroads Residents v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC,
No. CV 16-233 ADM/KMM, 2016 WL 3661146, at *7–8 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016).
Twelve states and a number of localities (including the District of Columbia)
have fair housing laws that ban discrimination against voucher holders, and other
states and localities ban, more generally, all types of source-of-income discrimination.
See SCHWEMM, supra note 14, § 30:3 n.3. In these places, a FHA-impact claim would
not be necessary to challenge a “No Section 8” policy. In a case within such an area, a
FHA-impact claim could be brought along with a supplemental state law claim that
would not need impact evidence. See, e.g., L.C. v. Lefrak Organization, Inc., 987 F.
Supp. 2d 391, 403–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
154. Cf. Jones v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., No. C–13–02390 LHK, 2015 WL
5091908, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2015) (denying defendant’s summary judgment
motion in FHA-impact challenge to its policy of not insuring landlords with Section 8
tenants on the ground that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, which was not described in
the opinion, was sufficient to show that this policy had a disparate impact on various
protected classes).
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ualize a large private apartment complex located in Washington, D.C.,
that has a “No Section 8” policy.
a. Identifying the Affected Group and Groups to be
Compared
The first step is to identify the group affected by this policy. The
short answer is potential applicants at the landlord’s complex, but how
should “potential” be defined? The challenged policy disqualifies
HCV holders, and the FHA-impact issue will be whether this group
disproportionately includes one or more protected classes, specifically
here whether blacks are disproportionately rejected by this policy.
Typically, the groups to be compared would be black potential
applicants versus white potential applicants.155 In the most common
form of FHA disparate-impact analysis,156 the comparison would be
between the percentage of blacks who use Section 8 vouchers versus
the percentage of whites who use these vouchers.
Due to the lack of adequate affordable housing for low-income
households, a local voucher program will often have a waiting list of
households that have met the basic HCV qualifications and will re-
ceive a voucher when one becomes available.157 Thus, the waiting list
is the most helpful source of data on the racial profile of potential
HCV applicants in the market. Indeed, because this list contains peo-
ple’s names, individuals excluded by a no-voucher policy can be
identified.158
Defining a reasonable market area for the analysis is also a criti-
cal part of the case.159 Here, that area chosen is the District of Colum-
bia (“D.C.”), because the landlord is located there and also because
155. We sometimes refer to whites in this context as the “control group.” Choosing a
proper control group for the comparisons would be based on a general assessment of
the racial and ethnic distribution of households within the housing market chosen for
the case. Occasionally, these considerations might lead to choosing a control group
other than whites (e.g., Hispanics).
156. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
157. While existing voucher holders are allowed to return to the market and seek a
new apartment, the most common situation is an applicant from the waiting list secur-
ing a voucher and entering the market. Also, the number of vouchers used by individ-
ual housing authorities may be reduced by local budget constraints or increased if
existing public housing units are demolished or otherwise lost and vouchers are pro-
vided to the displacees (who would then more closely reflect the racial profiles of
current public housing residents).
158. In tight housing markets, some private landlords may also maintain a waiting
list, but there is no public source for these data. Even if a landlord has his or her own
waiting list, a “No Section 8” policy would impose a harm on voucher holders, be-
cause they would be excluded from even getting on this list.
159. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\19-4\NYL403.txt unknown Seq: 39  6-JAN-17 14:11
2016] PROVING IMPACT 723
the households on the waiting list will likely be seeking housing
within D.C.160
b. Identifying the Data Sources
Different sources of data have their own strengths and weak-
nesses for a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact. Many of these are explored in this section.
As noted earlier,161 HUD produces annual data on the character-
istics of subsidized households by different geographic areas and by
different programs, including HCV. These data are accessible on-
line162 and can be used to determine the racial composition of existing
HCV households.
Two sources of data specifically relate to HCV households: (1)
those currently using vouchers; and (2) those on a local housing au-
thority’s waiting list.163 As noted earlier in this section, a waiting list,
if it exists, provides the most valuable data on the households seeking
units in the current market. Both HUD data on current voucher holders
and local agencies’ waiting-list data include information on the house-
holds’ race.
Because there are no public data showing the race of households
seeking apartments in most housing markets, Census Bureau data on
current renters’ profiles are typically used to approximate this infor-
mation.164 Here, data from Census Bureau reports may be used to re-
present the racial profile of the D.C. rental market.
As noted in Part II.A.1, the Census Bureau’s ACS produces an-
nual sets of housing data that are accessible online. The ACS’s
preformatted tables include data on renter households by race, show-
ing the number of black and white (non-Hispanic) households renting
in D.C. According to the 2014 ACS data, D.C. has 164,886 occupied
rental units, with 79,761 occupied by black households and 59,241
160. Section 8 vouchers are “portable,” which means that they may be used outside
the area of the local public housing authority that issued them. See Housing Choice
Voucher Program: Streamlining the Portability Process, 80 Fed. Reg. 50564 (Aug. 20,
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 982). This means that a voucher obtained in
D.C. may be used not only in D.C., but also in suburban Maryland or Virginia or
indeed in other parts of the country. Still, most HCV holders use their vouchers only
in the city where they currently live.
161. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
162. See websites cited supra note 132.
163. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
164. As in most forms of estimation in the social sciences, these data serve as the
base from which future patterns are predicted. Moreover, courts generally take judi-
cial notice of Census Bureau data. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Home State Mut. Ins. Co.,
654 F.3d 564, 571–72 (5th Cir. 2011).
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occupied by whites.165 Because D.C. is a sizeable rental market (with
168,886 rental units reported in the 2014 ACS), the ACS 1-year data
should provide a large enough sample for most sound disparate-impact
tests.
These data will be matched with the Section 8 waiting-list and
occupancy data for D.C.166 The D.C. Housing Authority’s data show
that there are 11,000 households in D.C. currently renting with Section
8 vouchers; the 2014 HUD data indicate that 95% of these households
(10,450) are black and 2% (220) are white. The waiting-list data show
that there are 25,000 households on the D.C. waiting list; of these,
93% (23,250) are black and 2% (500) are white.
c. Identifying Racial Disparities: Alternative Methodologies
and their Applications
Here we provide five examples of how to use the available data
to show disparate impact. The first four use the most commonly em-
ployed method of comparison in FHA-impact cases (i.e., comparing
blacks disqualified by a “No Section 8” policy versus their white
counterparts); the fifth compares blacks harmed by this policy to the
overall black population in the area.167
i. Comparing Black and White Renter Households on the
HCV Waiting List
The goal here is to compare the percentages of black and white
renter households that are disqualified by the challenged policy, using
the D.C. Housing Authority’s HCV waiting list. The black percentage
is produced by dividing the number of black households on this wait-
ing list by the number of black households in the overall D.C. rental
market (derived from the ACS data); these figures are: 23,250 ÷
79,761 = 29.15%. The white percentage is calculated by dividing the
number of white households on the waiting list by the number of
165. See the 2014 ACS 1-Year data on housing tenure and race for D.C., Table
B25003 for all households, Table B25003B for black households, and Table B25003H
for white households. For both the HCV and Census Bureau data, a black household is
defined as having a head of household who is black or African American alone and a
white household is defined as having a head of household who is white alone and not
Hispanic.
166. For many public housing authorities, their most recently available Section 8
data are from 2014. Unfortunately, the D.C. Housing Authority’s latest Section 8 data
are from 2012, but it is a fair assumption that these data approximate those for 2014;
we make this assumption here.
167. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text for a description of the first
method, and notes 87–89 and accompanying text for a description of the second.
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white households in the D.C. market; these figures are: 500 ÷ 59,241 =
0.84%. The results establish a large black-white disparity ratio of 34.7
(29.15% ÷ 0.84%), which indicates that black households are more
than 34 times as likely to be negatively impacted by the challenged
policy as white households. This is far above the standards found suf-
ficient in previous FHA-impact cases to establish a prima facie
case.168
In order to account for random error in both the Census Bureau
data and the data for D.C.’s HCV waiting list, a test should be run for
the statistically significant differences of the black and white percent-
ages.169 As discussed in Part I.C.2.d,170 this would show whether the
confidence intervals for the two percentages are independent of each
other.
In order to apply a test for statistically significant differences, a
standard error is calculated based on the Census Bureau’s instructions
on how to estimate the standard error for the ACS data.171 A confi-
dence level of 95% requires confidence intervals that are 1.96 standard
deviations around the percentages, but to be more conservative, we’ll
choose a 99% confidence level, which requires a confidence interval
that is 2.576 standard deviations. Using this higher confidence level,
the confidence interval for the percentage of black renters on the wait-
ing list ranges from 29.09% to 29.21%, and the confidence interval for
the percentage of white renters on the waiting list ranges from 0.85%
to 0.84%.172 The chart below compares these confidence intervals.
168. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
169. While waiting-list data are typically not reported as a sample, they are likely to
contain random mistakes. Out of a sense of caution, therefore, and to provide a con-
servative measure of the differences in the percentages, we treat the waiting-list data
as having the same random error as the Census Bureau data.
170. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part I.C.2.d.
172. While the calculated range is used here for illustrative purposes and to calculate
a test score, such percentages are effectively equal to zero.
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As the chart shows, there is no overlap between the two confi-
dence intervals. The test for statistically significant differences in the
two percentages produces a Z-Score that reflects the level of signifi-
cance in standard deviations. To meet the 99% level, the Z-Score
would have to be equal to or greater than 2.576; here, the Z-Score is
873.72, well above the required level.
This would seem sufficient to establish a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact. There are, however, some practical and statistical
problems that relate to this method of testing. First, there is no require-
ment that the households on a HVC waiting list reside in the jurisdic-
tion at that time. Here, this means that the households on D.C.’s
waiting list do not necessarily represent the renter households in the
D.C. market. Second, and perhaps more serious, is the fact that the
number of households on the waiting list is not a fixed standard, but is
determined internally by each individual housing authority.173 Be-
cause the black and white percentages previously used were calculated
from the numbers of black and white households on the waiting list,
those percentages could be changed by the local housing authority’s
decisions about when to open or close the waiting list and how many
households to include on the list.
ii. Comparing Black and White Renter Households
Currently Using Vouchers
Another approach would be to use the racial profiles of D.C.’s
existing voucher holders, as contrasted with the previous part’s use of
waiting-list profiles. (As noted earlier, some places may not have
waiting lists, and even for those that do, like D.C., looking at current
voucher users would help to confirm or discredit the waiting-list
method.) Data on the profiles of existing voucher holders would be
compared to the current profile of households occupying rental units
in D.C. Here, 10,450 of D.C.’s 11,000 current HCV holders are black
(95%), while 220 of these households are white (2%).
Running the same test for the difference in percentages at the
99% level of confidence, 13.10% of the black D.C. renter households
would be affected, while 0.37% of the white renter households would
be. As with the waiting-list analysis, the resulting disparity ratio is
extremely large – 35.41 – indicating that black households are over 35
times more likely to be negatively impacted by the challenged policy
173. The need for a waiting list is related to the practical consideration of having
enough people on the list to satisfy the recurring openings for new vouchers. Thus, for
example, D.C. may choose to limit its waiting list to no more than twice the number
of voucher-occupied units.
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than white households. The Z-Score would be 708.03, which means
that the percentages are different statistically above the 99% level of
confidence.
The waiting-list method and the current-user method each have
some strengths and weaknesses. While these two methods produce
similar results in D.C., there may be marked differences in the racial
distributions for these methods in other parts of the country. Where
this is so, we would argue that the waiting-list data should be used,
because it better reflects the likely rental applicants in the local hous-
ing market.174 Still, the weakness represented by discretionary
changes in the numbers on the waiting list counsel against placing
total reliance on this approach.
iii. Comparing Black and White Households Eligible for
the HCV Program Using Preformatted Census
Tables
Another method for assessing the challenged policy’s disparate
impact is to compare the populations of black and white households
that are eligible for vouchers. This group of potential voucher holders
is larger than the waiting-list and current-user groups (examined in i
and ii), because it includes all those who are eligible, not just those
who have applied.
As noted earlier, the basic eligibility standard for receiving a
voucher is household income.175 The preformatted ACS tables include
tables with the number of households reporting annual income in six-
teen ranges (from less than $10,000 to $200,000 or more). There are
separate tables for different racial groups and Hispanics, which can be
used to assess racial disparities in income.
The ACS income tables do not break down households by their
size, and thus the breaks in the income ranges do not match those for
the voucher program’s income-eligibility limits. This problem may be
diminished by running comparisons for each of the different ACS in-
come ranges; to the extent that significant disparities exist for all the
income ranges up to the eligibility limits, the data would justify con-
174. Housing authorities have some discretion in setting local preferences for differ-
ent types of households, such as homeless families or persons with disabilities. Along
with changes in the overall racial and ethnic patterns in the local area, this might
weigh in favor of using the waiting list.
175. See supra note 148.
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cluding that there is a disparate impact on households eligible for
vouchers.176
The table below shows the disparity ratios for black versus white
households based on the 2014 ACS tables for D.C. The underlined
income ranges indicate the best fit for the ELI limit of $31,100 and the
VLI limit of $53,500 for four-person households.177 The disparity ra-
tios are above 1.25 across all of the income ranges through the highest
ELI limit of $42,400. The first disparity ratio below 1.25 is in the
range that includes the highest income limit for VLI households with
eight or more persons, but there are few such households of any race
in D.C.178
 
  Income Ranges
Percent of All 
Black 
Households
Percent of All 
White 
Households
Disparity 
Ratio
  Less than $10,000 17.68 4.77 3.71
  $10,000 to $14,999 5.81 1.84 3.15
  $15,000 to $19,999 6.30 0.89 7.07
  $20,000 to $24,999 6.34 1.58 4.02
  $25,000 to $29,999 5.01 1.30 3.85
  $30,000 to $34,999 4.82 1.74 2.78
  $35,000 to $39,999 3.14 1.48 2.13
  $40,000 to $44,999 5.20 2.16 2.41
  $45,000 to $49,999 3.20 1.49 2.14
  $50,000 to $59,999 5.74 3.88 1.48
  $60,000 to $74,999 8.32 7.81 1.06
  $75,000 to $99,999 10.32 12.84 0.80
  $100,000 to $124,999 6.74 11.69 0.58
  $125,000 to $149,999 3.08 8.48 0.36
  $150,000 to $199,999 3.72 13.69 0.27
  $200,000 or More 4.58 24.37 0.19
District of Columbia Black to White Income Ranges for Households
2014 American Community Survey - Tables B19100B and B19100H
176. If some of the income categories are quite small and this affects the statistical
tests, the analysis should consider whether there is a consistent pattern of high dispar-
ity ratios above 1.25 across the income ranges.
177. For descriptions of the “ELI” and “VLI” concepts and for the fact that four-
person households are often used as a general measure in evaluating income-eligibil-
ity limits, see supra note 148.
178. The highest category for household size in the ACS preformatted tables is seven
or more persons. The ACS 2014 data for D.C. (Table B25009) indicate that less than
0.75% of the households have seven or more persons.
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The individual significance tests could be run in each range or the
ranges could be grouped to fit the general income-eligibility limits. To
illustrate, the following table shows calculations for the disparity ra-
tios and significance test Z-Scores for all households with incomes
less than $25,000, less than $35,000 (a surrogate for the generic ELI
limit), and less than $50,000 (a surrogate for the VLI generic limit).
The results are in the following table. The disparity ratios are all above
3.0, and the Z-Scores are well above the level required for a 99% level
of confidence.179 These data indicate a statistically significant differ-
ence in income levels for white and black households in D.C., espe-
cially for incomes that fall within the HUD definitions of ELI and VLI
households.
 
  Income Ranges
Percent of 
All Black 
Households
Percent of All 
White 
Households
Disparity 
Ratio
Significance 
Test Z 
Scores
  Less than $25,000 36.14 9.08 3.98 13.80
  Less than $35,000 45.97 12.12 3.79 15.60
  Less than $50,000 57.51 17.24 3.34 17.06
District of Columbia Black to White Income Levels for Households
2014 American Community Survey - Tables B19100B and B19100H
The ACS also provides comparable tables for income by race for
family households (i.e., those where the occupants are related by
blood or marriage and regardless of the presence of children). The
ACS tables that report households by type and presence of children
(Table B25115, for example) show that just under 8% of D.C. house-
holds are female-headed with children. D.C.’s voucher data indicate
that 39% of voucher households are female-headed with children.180
The following table shows the test results using the family data.
The pattern is somewhat different from the pattern for all households,
179. The calculations for defining error terms for combined ranges and for the test
for statistically significant differences in proportions were made using directions from
the Census Bureau’s “Accuracy of the Data” for the 2014 ACS.
180. This may suggest that statistical tests should be run on the racial data for in-
come ranges for families, because these results may be somewhat more representative
of the comparable market for voucher holders. However, while the “family” census
category includes children, it also includes households that have no children (e.g.,
married couples with no children and households with related persons none of whom
are the occupants’ children).
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but with roughly comparable high levels of statistical significance in
the Z-Scores. The percentage of households that fall within each of the
ranges is smaller for families. On the other hand, the disparity ratios
by race are considerably greater for families than for all households.
In either case, the relevant data show a significant disparate impact;
that is, the change in the definition of households does not eliminate
the sizeable differences by race.
  Income Ranges
Percent of 
Black Family 
Households
Percent of 
White Family 
Households
Disparity 
Ratio
Significance 
Test Z 
Scores
  Less than $25,000 29.27 2.22 13.16 12.41
  Less than $35,000 38.48 4.07 9.46 14.02
  Less than $50,000 49.43 5.96 8.29 16.85
District of Columbia Black to White Income Levels for Families
2014 American Community Survey - Tables B19101B and B19101H
iv. Comparing Black and White Households Eligible for
Vouchers Using the PUMS Data
The different methods of assessing racial disparities discussed so
far have used preformatted ACS tables and have provided a range of
conclusions that generally reveal a significant race-based disparate im-
pact, but they were also limited by the specific categories and data
chosen by the Census Bureau for these tables. As described in Part
II.A.2, the PUMS data provide a different Census Bureau resource that
can be used to develop estimates with more detailed controls for defin-
ing the most appropriate comparison groups.
In the case of D.C., there are five PUMAs that include the city
and are coterminous with D.C.’s boundaries. Therefore, the five-
PUMA market area is exactly the same as the city boundaries used in
the preformatted tables.181
The characteristics of the housing units can be refined in the sta-
tistical tests. In the ACS preformatted tables, rental households in-
clude a significant number of units that are not owner-occupied but
where the tenant does not actually pay rent. The PUMS data can
“clean up” the definition of the rental market by limiting it to house-
181. Cf. supra notes 116–17 (explaining that this is not always the case).
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holds that actually pay rent, making the market definition more com-
patible with the actual operation of a particular landlord-defendant.
This more precise definition produces a lower estimate of the to-
tal rental units within D.C. (from the ASC’s 164,886 to PUMS’s
158,996). The PUMS definition also produces a smaller estimate of
black households in the full D.C. market compared to the ACS’s
(72,784 versus 79,761).182 This is due in part to the fact that the ACS
tables by race include blacks who are also Hispanic, while the PUMS
data count only blacks who are black alone and not also Hispanic,
making the racial category parallel to that for whites. These refine-
ments reduce the estimated percentage of black renter households to
45.78% of the D.C. market compared to the ACS estimate of 48.37%.
Because the percent of black households on D.C.’s voucher waiting
list remains the same (93%), the disparity ratio increases somewhat (to
2.03). The Z-Score remains extremely significant at 17.27.
Refining the data for comparing blacks on the HCV waiting list
(or those using vouchers) may generally result in relatively minor var-
iations in the statistical tests. The PUMS data offer an opportunity to
match households to the actual income-eligibility limits, adjusting for
the number of occupants. This flexibility represents a significant ad-
vantage over the ACS data, which is locked into preformatted ranges.
The 2014 PUMS data for D.C. can be used to code each individual
record for paying rent and for household income below the voucher
income-eligibility levels based on the size of the household. This al-
lows a comparison of the percentages of eligible black and white ELI
and VLI households based on the actual income limits.
The PUMS data produce estimates that 48.83% of black renters
and 11.58% of white renters are ELI households. The test for statisti-
cally significant differences in proportions are run using the 99% level
of confidence and estimating standard errors according to the Census
Bureau’s directions for the use of the PUMS data. The Z-Score is
7.50, well above that required for a 99% confidence level. The dispar-
ity ratio is 4.22, meaning that black households are more than four
times as likely to be eligible for the HCV program as white house-
holds. These data represent a potentially stronger showing of disparate
impact both by focusing on renters rather than on all households and
by restricting the households to those who are actually income-eligible
based on household size. This is valuable because the data indicate
182. See supra note 114 (showing that, in D.C., the estimate for the total number of
occupied housing units from the 2014 PUMS (277,377) is close to the estimate from
the ACS tables (277,378)).
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that 84% of the existing voucher holders in D.C. fall within the ELI
threshold.183
v. Comparing Black Households on the HCV Waiting
List (or Currently Using Vouchers) to Black
Households in the General Rental Market
Another option would be to compare the percentage of black
households on the HCV waiting list (or currently using vouchers) to
the percentage of black households in the general market, a compara-
tive method commonly used in FHA land-use cases and some other
FHA-impact cases as well.184
In the tests using data on the waiting list or current voucher hold-
ers, the percentage of blacks in the population estimated to be on the
waiting list or using vouchers was based on the actual number of
households on the waiting list or using vouchers. These percentages
could change significantly if the actual number of persons on the wait-
ing list or using vouchers changed. Calculating a percentage of the full
waiting list or pool of voucher holders that are black, on the other
hand, will produce a figure that is much less likely to change with
changes in the numbers of those on the waiting list or using vouchers.
In part, this is because the economic, political, social, legal, and regu-
latory factors and practices that contribute to the individual decisions
reflected in the overall patterns of those applying for and receiving
vouchers is not dependent upon the actual numbers on the waiting list
or using vouchers. The profile of households eligible and actually ap-
plying for vouchers is likely to be similar whether the waiting list is
restricted to a few hundred households or expanded to include several
thousand.185
For example, for the waiting list data for Washington, 93% of the
households were black. If the list is reduced by half from 25,000 to
12,500, but the forces that contribute to those applying for vouchers
and being placed on the waiting list are the same, then we would ex-
pect half as many blacks (23,250 reduced to 11,625) and also half as
many whites (500 reduced to 250) to be on the waiting list. The result
183. A test can also be run for households in the market meeting the VLI threshold.
The base percentage for black households is 66.15% and for white households is
18.35%. The Z-Score is 9.24. The disparity ratio is 3.60, meaning that even at this
higher income threshold, black households are more than three-and-a-half times as
likely as whites to meet HUD’s VLI standard.
184. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
185. This is also true of the racial patterns in the ACS sample that are used to esti-
mate the profile of the general rental market.
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would still be that 93% of those on the waiting list are black (11,625 ÷
12,500 = 93%).186
Therefore, an advantage of comparing the percentage of blacks
on the waiting list to the percentage of black households in the general
market is that this comparison takes advantage of the likelihood that
the waiting list is a good indicator of the potential applicants who will
seek to use HCVs in the general market. This comparison suffers less
from differences in the size of the waiting list and does not suffer from
the conceptual problem related to the assumption that the households
on the waiting list are currently part of the D.C. general rental market.
The waiting list represents households that are likely to apply for
apartments regardless of where they currently live. Meanwhile, the
ACS data represent a sound estimate of the current profile of renters in
the market.
This method begins with the percentage of black households on
the waiting list; this is 93% (23,250 ÷ 25,000).187 This 93% figure is
compared to the percentage of all renter households in the market. The
ACS 2014 data indicate that there are 79,761 black renter households
in D.C. compared to a total of 164,886 total rental households, produc-
ing a figure of 48.37% (79,761 ÷ 164,886).
The result is a disparity ratio of 1.91 (93% ÷ 48.73%), indicating
that black households are almost twice as likely to be on the voucher
waiting list as they are to be in the overall market.188 Conceptually, it
provides a reasonable estimate of the extent to which black renter
households are disproportionately concentrated among those on the
voucher waiting list.
As with the previously described methods, confidence intervals
should be calculated around these two percentages using standard for-
mulas and the Census Bureau’s directions for calculating random error
in the ACS data. Using the 99% confidence level, the confidence in-
terval for the percentage of black households on the reduced voucher
waiting list ranges from 91.69% to 94.31%; the confidence interval for
the percentage of black households in the overall D.C. rental market
ranges from 46.02 to 50.72. The Z-Score is extremely high (at 42.71).
Even if a reduced waiting list of 2,500 households is used, the results
186. Increasing or decreasing the number of households on the waiting list or using
vouchers may produce estimates with smaller or larger standard error terms, see supra
note 103, but the general patterns (e.g., the percentages of blacks or whites) are likely
to remain roughly the same.
187. See supra Chart 1 in Part III.A.1.c.i.
188. This is a conservative measure, because the percentage of black households in
the overall market includes black households on the voucher list.
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of the test are statistically significant, so long as the proportion of
households that are black remains at 93%.
Similar results are produced by comparing the percentage of
black households using vouchers to the percentage of black renters in
the overall market. Here, 95% of the voucher holders are black
(10,450 of 11,000 total voucher holders) compared to the estimated
48.37% of the overall rental market. Applying the same methods for
estimating the standard errors and confidence intervals for a 99% con-
fidence level, the Z-Score for the test is high (at 49.86), and the dis-
parity ratio is 1.96.
The disparity ratios using this comparative method are much
smaller than those produced by the black-versus-white methods dis-
cussed earlier. This is partly a mathematical artifact based on the over-
all percentage of black households in the rental market. Because this
percentage is so large in D.C., the disparity ratio produced by the cur-
rent method cannot be extremely large, even when close to all the
households on the waiting list are black. In the previous methods, be-
cause the percentage of the full rental market represented by house-
holds assumed to be on the waiting list or those using vouchers is
small, the disparity ratios will be quite high whenever blacks represent
a great majority of those on the waiting list.
d. Choosing Which Comparative Method to Use
The previous section’s exploration of several alternative methods
for showing the disparate impact of a landlord’s “No Section 8” policy
suggests that using the PUMS data is the best approach among the
data sources available. PUMS allows one to define the market and the
particular racial households to fit the conditions of the HCV program
and the nature of the D.C. market in such a case. However, similar
claims in other parts of the country, especially where the PUMS areas
do not fit the market area defined for the case, may find that using
ACS data and other comparative methods are as good or better. Focus-
ing on a single method, however well it seems to fit the particulars of
the case, involves a risk that the court may not be convinced by this
lone approach. Using multiple methods, multiple sets of data, and dif-
ferent definitions of the market area can show that changes in the mea-
sures and reasonable changes in the definition of the market will not
eliminate the racial disparities.
The different methods explored here for this one hypothetical
provide a base for commenting on how different data sources and
methods might be applied in FHA challenges to other types of screen-
ing policies. Some of these are reviewed next in Part III.A.2.
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2. Other Screening Devices and FHA-Impact Challenges
This section examines how statistical evidence might be
presented to support a FHA-impact challenge to a variety of landlord
screening policies that might disproportionately harm a protected
class. The policies and protected classes discussed are:
• maximum occupancy restrictions—families with children;
• source-of-income restrictions—disability;
• minimum credit-score requirements—race and national origin;
• “No Criminal Record” policy—race and national origin;
• eviction for domestic-violence incidents—sex; and,
• English-language requirements—national origin.
a. Maximum Occupancy Restrictions—Families with Children
Ever since the FHA’s 1988 amendments banned discrimination
against families with children, a major portion of the litigation in this
area has involved challenges to landlords’ occupancy policies.189 Typ-
ically, such a policy takes the form of restricting units of a certain size
to households with fewer than a certain number. For example, a policy
of refusing to rent one-bedroom units to more than two persons would
disqualify a couple with a baby (and all other three-or-more groups),
and a couple in such an apartment would be required to leave if they
had a child (as would two people who took in another adult).
The FHA-impact issue is whether such an occupancy restriction
disqualifies households with children at a significantly higher rate than
those without children in the relevant housing market. The analysis
that follows is based on a recent ruling in favor of a FHA-impact chal-
lenge to a Rhode Island landlord’s two-person-per-bedroom policy as
applied to a couple with a newborn baby.190
The first step is to identify the housing market for the defendant-
landlord’s complex. This has both a geographic component (e.g., the
market for a landlord’s complex near Providence, Rhode Island, may
be defined as the entire state because the state is so small) and a
rental-charge component (e.g., the landlord here charged $900–$1050
189. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 40 and 47. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.
& URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING: FY 2012-2013, 18–19 (2014),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=2012-13annreport.pdf (report-
ing that about 15% of FHA complaints in the 2010-2013 period alleged familial status
discrimination).
190. See R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110, 124–26
(D.R.I. 2015). This ruling relied heavily on a report by a co-author of this Article. See
id. at 126–28.
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for one-bedroom units and $1250–$1400 for two-bedroom units for an
overall range of $900–$1400).
The Census Bureau’s data fit well with this problem.191 The Bu-
reau’s data measure the presence of children in a household at the
local level, and its definition of this feature is virtually identical to the
FHA’s definition of the protected class of “familial status.”192 Using
the Bureau’s PUMS data for the relevant time period,193 disparate-
impact measures can be calculated by comparing households with and
without children for all households with the same number of persons
(e.g., three people). This can be done for all-rent levels in the area and
also for the subgroup of households paying rents in the defendant-
landlord’s range.
For all-rent levels, the PUMS data yield an estimate that 44,618
households with children lived in the Rhode Island market, of which
14,101 have three persons;194 thus, the challenged policy disqualifies
31.60% of all the households with children (14,101 ÷ 44,618). The
comparable figures for households without children are a total of
108,790, 7,563 of which have three persons; this means that 6.95%
(7,563 ÷ 108,790) of the non-children households are excluded by the
landlord’s policy.
Because the PUMS data are based on sampling and thus produce
random errors, it is necessary to calculate the standard of error for
these percentages and test them for a certain confidence level.195 Tests
with a 99% confidence level require a confidence interval around the
estimated percentage that is plus or minus 2.576 adjusted standard er-
191. To provide a proper measure for disparate impact here requires data that are
more detailed than just households with and without children; the data must also be
broken down by household size. A further breakdown may also be needed by either
the income of the households and/or the rent that households pay in order to match the
assessment with households that are within the income and/or rent ranges of the de-
fendant-landlord’s apartment complex. The ACS tables do not provide these break-
downs, but they may be created by using the PUMS data.
192. The Census Bureau defines a family with children as a household where at least
one of the occupants is a person under 18 years of age; the FHA’s definition of “fa-
milial status” also focuses on having an under-18 person in the household, but it is
slightly larger (e.g., it includes pregnancy). See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2012).
193. For a description of the PUMS data, see supra Part II.A.2.
194. Estimates here are based on the weighted values provided for each individual
household in the PUMS sample for the 2008–2012 ACS.
195. See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
2008–2012 ACS PUMS ACCURACY OF THE DATA (2012), http://www2.census.gov/
programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/pums/accuracy/2008_2012AccuracyPUMS.pdf.
Here, using the Census Bureau’s formula for doing this yields an adjusted standard
error deviation of 1.919 % for households with children comprising three people.
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ror deviations (here totaling 4.94%);196 this creates a confidence inter-
val around the 31.60% percentage of 26.66% (31.60% – 4.94%) to
36.54% (31.60% + 4.94%). The same procedure is followed for the
percentage of households without children that contain three persons
(6.95%): the adjusted standard of error for a 99% confidence level is
plus or minus 1.731%, which creates a confidence interval that ranges
from 5.22% (6.95% – 1.731%) to 8.68% (6.95% + 1.731%).
There is no overlap in the two confidence intervals (i.e., the
lower limit for the percentage of three-person households with chil-
dren (26.66%) is higher than the upper limit for the percentage of
those without (8.68%)). The Z-Score confirms that the difference in
these estimated percentages is statistically significant beyond the 99%
level of confidence. Therefore, these percentages can be used to calcu-
late a disparity ratio. Here, this is 4.55 (31.60% ÷ 6.95%). This means
that households with three persons are more than four and one-half
times as likely to have a child compared to those with no children,
which is well above the standards used to judge an actionable dispa-
rate impact.197
The same analysis may be done for area households that actually
pay rent in the range of the defendant-landlord’s units. For households
with children paying rent in this $900–$1,400 range, 30.73% are esti-
mated to have three persons; the comparable figure for households
without children is 9.63%. These results are also statistically signifi-
cant beyond the 99% level and produce a disparity ratio of 3.19
(30.73% ÷ 9.63%), again well above the actionable standard.198
196. Both the standard error and the confidence intervals are extremely sensitive to
the sample size and the nature of the sampling design. See supra note 103. With
respect to the latter, there are adjustments in the census samples to the standard error
related to the complexities of the sampling design for selecting households included in
the sample. These adjustments increase the standard error, which in turn increases the
range of the confidence interval. All else being equal, this makes it less likely that
differences in the estimated percentages for two groups will be statistically significant.
For an explanation of the methods used to calculate the confidence intervals and for
the specific formulas and examples of their use, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note
195.
197. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
198. In the actual case, a similar analysis was also done for four-person and five-
person households with tests that are statistically significant at more than the 99%
confidence level, both for all renter households in the state and for those paying rent
in the $900-$1,400 range. The results for all-state renters were disparity ratios of
14.25 for four-person households and 6.92 for five-person households; the results for
state renters paying rents in the defendant-landlord’s range were disparity ratios of
12.84 for four-person households and 7.65 for five-person households. Thus, the pat-
tern of statistically significant disparities due to familial status was robust, and the
magnitudes of the disparities were all extremely large.
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b. Source-of-Income Restrictions—Disability
Some landlords rent only to people who have a job or other tradi-
tional source of income that produces a certain minimum monthly in-
come (e.g., they refuse to rent to people whose principal source of
income is Social Security or other government-benefit program). The
FHA-impact issue presented by such a screening device is whether it
disqualifies members of a FHA-protected class (e.g., persons with dis-
abilities) at a significantly higher rate than those outside this class in
the relevant housing market. The analysis that follows is based on a
report by a co-author of this Article in a case brought in 2010 chal-
lenging a “Must Be Employed” policy of a landlord in Hartford,
Connecticut.199
The first step is to identify the market for the defendant-land-
lord’s complex. As noted elsewhere, this has a geographic component
(e.g., the market for the Hartford landlord’s complex may be defined
geographically as Hartford County) and sometimes a rental-charge
component. Fortunately, the Census Bureau provides preformatted ta-
bles with localized data on disabled versus non-disabled persons who
are employed.200 Data from the 2006 ACS for Hartford County (Table
B18020) may be separated into the two categories of persons—those
with a disability and those without.201 These groups are then further
divided into persons who were employed and persons who were not
employed. The test is then run on these groups for all persons 16–64
years old.
This allows for a comparison between the percentages of persons
with disabilities who are not employed and a similar percentage for
non-disabled persons. The sample data from Table B18020 yields esti-
mates that there were 59,053 persons with disabilities in Hartford
County, of whom 33,659 were not employed (and thus would be dis-
qualified by the challenged policy); the disqualified group thus ac-
counts for 57% of all the persons with disabilities (33,659 ÷ 59,053).
Applying a similar methodology for non-disabled persons yields esti-
mates in Hartford County of 506,915 persons without disabilities, of
199. See Complaint, Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Rosow, No. 3:10-cv-01987-MRK
(D. Conn. Dec. 17, 2010) (settled May 7, 2013) (complaint and settlement agreement
on file with authors).
200. The ACS data also provide tables on disability by race and gender, but not
combined with employment status. If a case required data on disability status com-
bined with other factors (e.g., rent levels, gender, race, or familial status), one would
need to use the PUMS data and create the particular combinations of groups to
compare.
201. This is the same format as the 2010–2014 example (C18120 for the United
States) used as an example of an ACS table. See supra Part II.A.1.
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whom 112,366 are not employed; thus, the disqualified group ac-
counts for 22.17% of all non-disabled persons (112,366 ÷ 506,915).
The differences are statistically significant at well beyond the
99% level. The disparity ratio is therefore 2.57 (57.00% ÷ 22.17%),
which is well above the 1.25 standard for establishing a prima facie
case of disparate impact.202 The remaining questions in the case would
be whether the defendant-landlord could prove a sufficient justifica-
tion for its policy and, if so, whether the plaintiff could identify a less
discriminatory alternative.203
c. Minimum Credit-Score Requirements—Race and National
Origin204
Credit scores are a convenient way for lenders and other busi-
nesses to gauge an individual’s creditworthiness and are regularly
used by mortgage providers, home insurers, and some landlords to
evaluate applicants.205 For example, a landlord might refuse to rent
to—or demand more financial security from—applicants with a FICO
credit score below, say, 620.206
202. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part I.B.2. Assuming that the landlord’s legitimate concern is the
prospective tenants’ financial ability to pay the rent, alternatives might include requir-
ing prospects to show their having successfully paid rent in the past, either from per-
sonal resources or from a government subsidy program.
With respect to inquiries directed to disabled prospects, HUD and other agencies
have cautioned lenders about possible disability-discrimination issues raised by their
questioning an applicant’s use of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BUL-
LETIN 2014–03, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INCOME VERIFICATION (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_bulletin_disability-income.pdf (sum-
marizing and providing citations to guidance on this topic from HUD, CFPB, VA,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac). Violation of this guidance may lead to a FHA com-
plaint. See Charge of Discrimination against Bank of America (HUD Jan. 23, 2012),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=12bankofamerica508.pdf.
204. The discussion in this section also reveals grounds for possible claims based on
disability and familial status. See infra note 209.
205. See Credit Scores and Credit Reports: Problematic Uses and How They Worsen
the Racial Economic Gap, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., (May 20, 2014), http://www
.nclc.org/national-elder-rights-training-program/housing-consumer-related-issues/
credit-scores-and-credit-reports-problematic-uses-and-how-they-worsen-the-racial-
economic-gap.html.
206. The most popular credit score is Fair Isaac’s “FICO,” which uses a range of
about 300–850. See, e.g., Ann Carrns, Is That Credit Score a FICO, or a FICO 8?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/is-
that-credit-score-a-fico-or-a-fico-8/. About 25% of Americans’ FICO scores are 620
or below, and this group is disproportionately made up of blacks and Hispanics. See
infra note 207 (describing Freddie Mac study).
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A number of studies have shown that credit scores have a dis-
criminatory effect on racial minorities.207 However, the data underly-
ing these studies are not produced on a regular basis and are not
broken down by local areas. Indeed, no data set is publicly available
that could be used to link race and credit scores for a local housing
market. Commercial services may sell aggregate credit-score data by
local areas, but linking this to race (e.g., based on an area’s racial
make-up) is tenuous, partly because these data are often produced by
ZIP codes, which are generally too large to make clear distinctions by
race.
Some FHA claims have challenged the use of credit scores by
mortgage lenders and home insurers,208 but we know of no reported
decision that has yet ruled on such a claim against a landlord.209 If
such a claim were to find sufficient data to establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact, it might well succeed, either because the defen-
dant-landlord could not satisfy its burden of justification or the plain-
tiff could show a less discriminatory alternative.210
207. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 205 (citing, inter alia, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONSUMER AND CREDITOR
PURCHASED CREDIT SCORES 20 (Sept. 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201209_Analysis_Differences_Consumer_Credit.pdf (median FICO score for major-
ity-minority areas was 34 compared to 52 for low-minority areas on 100-point scale);
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT
SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT O-
13 (2007) (mean scores of blacks was half of whites (25.6 versus 54.0 on 100-point
scale); FED. TRADE COMM’N., CREDIT BASED INSURANCE SCORES 3 (2007) (blacks
and Hispanics are strongly over-represented in the lowest scoring categories); FRED-
DIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER AND
FAIRER FOR AMERICA’S FAMILIES (1996) (blacks are three times as likely to have
FICO scores below 620 as whites; Hispanics are twice as likely as whites to have
FICO scores below 620)).
208. See supra note 39 (claim against home insurer using FICO).
209. For a description of the recent filing of such a case, see John Reinan, Upmarket
Changes at Richfield Complex Spark Federal Lawsuit, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/upscale-changes-at-massive-richfield-ap
artment-complex-spark-discrimination-lawsuit/367359251/ (describing FHA suit
against landlord whose screening requirements included a minimum credit score of
625 and an income of three times the rent, which allegedly would negatively impact
people of color, families with children, and people with disabilities); see also Cross-
roads Residents v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC, No. CV 16-233 ADM/KMM,
2016 WL 3661146, at *6-9 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016) (upholding FHA-impact claims in
this case that challenged numerous screening devices, but without focusing on the
credit-score requirement).
210. See supra Part I.B.2. Because credit scores (except some recent hybrids) do not
include rent payments, they are suspect as predictors for paying rent. Therefore, land-
lords should be able to find better alternatives to gauge an applicant’s likelihood of
making future payments.
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d. “No Criminal Record” Policy—Race and National
Origin211
i. Overview; U.S. Arrest-and-Incarceration Trends and
their Racial Elements
As with the other screening devices discussed thus far, the group
affected by a “No Criminal Record” policy is potential applicants at
the landlord’s apartment complex, and the FHA-impact issue is
whether the people disqualified by this policy are disproportionately
racial or ethnic minorities compared with whites. We will assume that
the landlord is located in a large metropolitan area and thus the data
sources described earlier are able to yield, as they did in the “No Sec-
tion 8” example for Washington, D.C., race-based data about persons
who make up the relevant housing market.212 Thus, the key problem
will be to identify race-based data on those persons disqualified by the
“No Criminal Record” policy in this market.
Imprisonment rates in the United States have increased dramati-
cally in recent decades.213 During this period, racial and ethnic minori-
ties have come to account for an increasing portion of those arrested
and incarcerated.214 As far as incarceration rates, African Americans
211. The data discussed in this section also reveal grounds for a possible gender-
based claim. See infra note 219.
212. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meet-
ing-american-bar-associations [hereinafter Holder Remarks] (“While the entire U.S.
population has increased by about a third since 1980, the federal prison population has
grown at an astonishing rate—by almost 800 percent.”). From 1978, the number of
inmates in state and federal prisons experienced a five-fold increase, reaching a peak
of 1,615,487 in 2009. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014 3 tbl.2 (Sept. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [hereinafter 2014 PRISONERS] (reporting yearly increases in the
total prison population from 2004 through 2009’s peak, with decreases thereafter to
2014, whose total of 1,561,525 was comparable to the 2006 figure). By 2012, an
estimated 100 million Americans (nearly one in three) had some type of criminal
record. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE
CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS: 2012, at 3 (Jan. 2014), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf.
214. See, e.g., Holder Remarks, supra note 213 (noting that “young black and Latino
men are disproportionately likely to become involved in our criminal justice system”).
Recent data show that African Americans and Hispanics are arrested at a rate two to
three times their proportion of the general population. In 2010, African Americans
accounted for 28% of all arrests, UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S. 2010, tbl.43a (2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/table-43/10tbl43a.xls,
even though they made up only about 14% of the overall population. U.S. CENSUS
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are imprisoned at a rate over five times higher than whites;215 in 2010,
black men had an imprisonment rate that was nearly seven times
higher than white men and almost three times higher than Hispanic
men.216 Hundreds of thousands of these people are released from
prison every year.217
ii. Relevant Data Sources and their Gaps
The primary source for crime-related data in the United States is
the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”),218
which publishes yearly reports that provide national statistics on the
number of sentenced prisoners by race, Hispanic origin, sex, and age.
A recent BJS report (reflecting data at the end of 2014) shows that, of
the total of 1,508,636 prisoners subject to U.S. and state correctional
authorities, blacks accounted for 36% (539,500), whites for 34%
BUREAU, C201BR-06, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010 3 (Sept. 2011), https://www
.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.
Accurate data on the number of Hispanics arrested and convicted in the United
States is limited. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUI-
DANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOY-
MENT n.67 (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 EEOC GUIDANCE], https://www.eeoc
.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm. One revealing statistic, however, is that,
with respect to federal drug charges in 2008, Hispanics were arrested at a rate approx-
imately three times higher than their proportion of the general population. Id.
215. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUS-
TICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 10 (Jul., 2007), http:/
/www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Uneven-Justice-State-
Rates-of-Incarceration-by-Race-and-Ethnicity.pdf. Seven of the states examined in
this state-by-state study had a black-to-white incarceration ratio of 10-to-1 or higher.
Id. at 11.
216. Id.; see also 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 15 (reporting that at yearend
2014, 2.7% of black males, 1.1% of Hispanic males, and 0.5% of white males were
serving prison sentences of at least one year); Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the
Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 256, 263 (2013) (noting that
the incarceration rate for black males is seven times higher than that of white males
and that “Hispanic men are nearly three times as likely to be incarcerated as White
men”). In some states with large minority populations, the ratios are even higher. See
id. at 264 (noting that, in New York state prisons in 2011, 78% of the inmates were
persons of color).
217. See, e.g., 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 10 tbl.7 (reporting that 623,990
people were released from federal and state prisons in 2013 and 636,346 in 2014); id.
at 29 app. tbls.1 & 2 (reporting similar-to-higher figures for each year dating back to
2004).
218. See About the Bureau of Justice Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (noting that the
BJS collects, analyzes, and disseminates information on crime, criminal offenders,
victims of crime, and the operation of justice systems at all levels of government).
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(506,600), Hispanics for 21% (326,500), and other ethnic groups for
9% (136,100).219
These are national figures. The BJS’s reports do include data for
individual states, but these figures are not broken down by race or
ethnicity.220 As noted in Part I.C.2.a, FHA-impact cases generally re-
quire local, as opposed to national, statistics to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact;221 national data may be used if local figures
are not available and no evidence suggests that the two are markedly
different,222 but these conditions will not always be present when
dealing with criminal records.223
Another problem is that the reports discussed here deal only with
prisoners, not with ex-offenders who are back in the community and
seeking housing. The BJS’s annual reports do provide statistics by
state for released prisoners, but these are not broken down by race,
ethnicity, sex, or any other category.224 Thus, a court assessing the
racial impact of a landlord’s “No Criminal Record” policy would have
to make the assumption that prison data carry forward and are re-
flected in the post-incarceration population. This is a leap that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has been
219. 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 29 app. tbl.3. In 2011, 478 of every
100,000 white men and 51 of every 100,000 white women were imprisoned, with the
comparable per-100,000 figures for black men and women being, respectively, 3,023
and 129. DeVeaux, supra note 216, at 264. With respect to gender in 2014, men
accounted for 93% of prisoners (1,402,404). 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 29
app. tbl.3. Not surprisingly, the BJS reports do not include information on inmates’
income or net worth.
220. See 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 3 tbl.2, 30–31 app. tbls. 4–6. The state
figures are, however, broken down by gender. See id. at 3 tbl.2, 6 tbl.4, 31 app. tbl.6.
221. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
223. Some states and larger municipalities maintain data on arrests, convictions, and
incarcerated persons broken down by race, national origin, or other categories. See,
e.g., STATE OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & CMTY. SUPERVISION, UNDER
CUSTODY REPORT: PROFILE OF INMATE POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1,
2013, at 3–11 (2013), http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/2013/UnderCus-
tody_Report_2013.pdf; see also Alexander v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., No. 15-01140
(RCL), 2016 WL 5957673, at *4 (D. D.C. June 25, 2016) (upholding FHA-impact
claim challenging landlord’s “No Criminal Record” policy based on crime-related sta-
tistics from the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area). In these areas, presumably this
more localized data would be required. Further, some localities show markedly differ-
ent rates than are reflected in the national figures. See MAUER & KING, supra note
215; 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 4, 7–11.
224. See 2014 PRISONERS, supra note 213, at 10–11 tbl.7. The same is true for BJS’s
reports concerning persons who are on probation and/or parole (i.e., they do not pro-
vide race-based or other breakdowns).
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willing to make in Title VII cases,225 but it is mostly unchartered terri-
tory in FHA challenges to landlords’ crime-based screening policies.
iii. Title VII Guidance and Recent HUD Pronouncements
Title VII cases challenging the racial impact of job policies ex-
cluding persons with criminal records date back to the 1970s.226 In
1987, the EEOC issued guidance on this topic,227 which reinforced its
long-held position that “where there is evidence of adverse impact, an
absolute bar to employment based on the mere fact that an individual
has a conviction record is unlawful under Title VII.”228 The EEOC has
maintained this position ever since, including in its most recent itera-
tion of this guidance published in 2012.229
The 2012 Guidance made a number of other basic points, many
of which are readily transferrable to the housing field.230 Importantly,
as to proving a prima facie case of disparate impact, the EEOC con-
cluded that “[n]ational data supports a finding that criminal record ex-
clusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin.”231
Were courts to apply these Title VII principles in the housing field, it
is clear that a landlord’s blanket exclusion of all applicants with a
criminal record would face impact-based liability under the FHA.232
225. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
226. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977); Richardson v. Hotel
Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff’d, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
227. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE
ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(Feb. 4, 1987), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html.
228. Id.
229. With respect to criminal records, there is Title VII disparate impact liabil-
ity where the evidence shows that a covered employer’s criminal record
screening policy or practice disproportionately screens out a Title VII-
protected group and the employer does not demonstrate that the policy or
practice is job related for the positions in question and consistent with
business necessity.
2012 EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 8.
230. These include that an employer’s exclusion of people with criminal records may
violate Title VII based on either an intent or impact theory. Id. at 3. The same general
idea has long been adopted in FHA cases. See supra note 34 para. 2.
231. 2012 EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 9. Some Title VII cases, however,
have refused to accept national figures. See Watkins v. City of Chicago, 73 F. Supp.
2d 944, 949 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that statistical evidence that blacks have higher
arrest rates than whites in the general population is insufficient to established dispa-
rate impact in defendant-City’s hiring); EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723
F. Supp. 734, 751 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie
showing of disparate impact because statistical evidence did not sufficiently focus on
the relevant labor market and applicant flow data).
232. This would certainly be true if the exclusionary policy relied on arrests as well
as convictions, but it would probably also be true even if only convictions were con-
sidered. Cf. 2012 EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 24 (advising employers to
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For its part, HUD has been relatively quiet about this issue, at
least until recently. HUD’s commentary to its 2013 impact regulation
opined only that a FHA-impact challenge to a landlord’s screening of
tenants with criminal records would depend “on the facts of the situa-
tion,” but it did promise “to explore the issue more fully” in the fu-
ture.233 Finally, in April of 2016, HUD’s General Counsel issued a
paper entitled Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act Standards
to the Use of Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and Real
Estate-Related Transactions.234 This Guidance, which followed by a
few months a HUD directive to public housing agencies and other
federally assisted housing providers on the same topic,235 adopted
many of the EEOC’s positions, including endorsing the use of national
statistics to prove that a landlord’s use of a criminal-records screening
device has a disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics.236
“[e]liminate policies or practices that exclude people from employment based on any
criminal record”); see also infra note 236 para. 2.
233. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11478.
234. HUD, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FAIR
HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF
HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (Apr. 4, 2016), https://portal
.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HUD_OGCGuidAppFHAStandCR.pdf
[hereinafter HUD GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE].
235. See HUD, GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF
FEDERALLY-ASSISTED HOUSING ON EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN
HOUSING DECISIONS: NOTICE PIH 2015–19, at 2 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=PIH2015-19.pdf [hereinafter HUD PHA GUIDANCE].
This directive advised that “arrest records may not be the basis for denying admission,
terminating assistance or evicting tenants,” and, though it did not directly address the
legality of considering conviction records, did remind its addressees of “their obliga-
tion to ensure that any admissions and occupancy requirements” must comply with the
FHA and suggested some “best practices” for limiting screening policies that relate to
conviction records. Id. at 2, 5-7.
236. See HUD GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE, supra note 234, at 3 (“[N]ational sta-
tistics on racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system may be used
where, for example, state or local statistics are not readily available and there is no
reason to believe they would differ markedly from the national statistics. . . . National
statistics provide grounds for HUD to investigate complaints challenging criminal his-
tory policies.”).
With respect to Step Two of a FHA impact case’s analysis, see supra note 28 and
accompanying text, this guidance also opined that a housing provider’s use of arrest
records would never be justified and that its blanket ban of persons with conviction
records would also not be justified. See id. at 5–6 (“[A] housing provider who denies
housing to persons on the basis of arrests not resulting in conviction cannot prove that
the exclusion actually assists in protecting resident safety and/or property. . . . A
housing provider that imposes a blanket prohibition on any person with any convic-
tion record – no matter when the conviction occurred, what the underlying conduct
entailed, or what the convicted person has done since then – will be unable to meet
this [Step Two] burden.”).
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iv. Application to “No Criminal Record” Policy
As noted in Part I.C.2.b,237 the most commonly used method of
measuring disparate impact requires dividing the number of blacks
disqualified by the defendant’s policy by their number in the local
rental market and comparing that ratio to a comparably derived ratio
for whites. The problem here is that, although the numbers for these
groups in the rental market may be identified, the data for black and
white ex-offenders may not be available. This is because, as noted
earlier, the data sources on prisoners generally focus on national statis-
tics and also because there are no sources for the racial make-up of
released prisoners.238
Still, it seems legitimate to infer that the great race-based dispari-
ties in national prison data would translate into similar disparities in
the population of ex-offenders now a part of most local housing mar-
kets.239 However, even if a plaintiff challenging a “No Criminal Re-
cord” policy is able to make out a prima facie case, an additional
problem might arise if the defendant-landlord is able to satisfy its bur-
den of proving a legitimate justification for this policy. This is cer-
tainly possible; it has occasionally been done by employers in
comparable Title VII cases,240 and certain housing providers may have
special reasons to be concerned about renting to ex-offenders.241
237. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
238. Another potential problem might arise if the landlord in question charged high
enough rents to limit its market to those in certain income ranges, because, as noted
above, the data sources on prisoners, while revealing racial information, does not in-
clude income data, see supra note 219, and it seems at least intuitively obvious that
ex-offenders, as a group, would have less wealth than those without a criminal record.
239. In a somewhat analogous vein, Judge Gertner ruled in favor of a FHA-impact
claim challenging local-residency preferences by Boston-area suburbs, noting that
there is an “overarching intuitive principle that compromises their case: where a com-
munity has a smaller proportion of minority residents than does the larger geographi-
cal area from which it draws applicants to its Section 8 program, a selection process
that favors its residents cannot but work a disparate impact on minorities.” Langlois v.
Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 62 (D. Mass. 2002). In an earlier decision
in this case involving the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the First
Circuit approved Judge Gertner’s impact finding based on how the comparative
groups would “likely” or “probably” be affected by the challenged policies. See Lan-
glois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2000).
240. See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding
on public safety grounds defendant’s policy of excluding all persons ever convicted of
a violent crime from the job of transit driver). See generally 2012 EEOC GUIDANCE,
supra note 214, at 24 (describing certain circumstances in which an employer’s
screening for criminal records would be justified).
241. Federal law authorizes and in some cases mandates public housing authorities
to exclude tenants with specific types of criminal records. See, e.g., HUD PHA GUI-
DANCE, supra note 235, at 2 n.5 (discussing PHAs’ anti-drug responsibilities). Private
landlords are not subject to these restrictions, but it would seem unlikely that a court
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The burden would then shift back to the plaintiff to prove a less
discriminatory alternative. The most obvious alternative would be to
limit the landlord’s rule against persons with criminal records to only
certain types of crimes and/or recent time periods (e.g., only identified
crimes committed within the past five years).242 Such an approach
would reflect not only federal law’s mandates to public housing agen-
cies243 and recent HUD guidance,244 but also the advice of some pri-
vate-landlord trade associations.245
As noted in Part I, while the alternative of a more limited ban on
persons with criminal records may sound appealing, the issue remains
whether such an alternative could be shown to have “a less discrimina-
tory effect” than a total ban.246 This would require proof that the
smaller group disqualified by this alternative would have a lower pro-
portion of blacks versus whites than the group screened out by a total
ban. Given the likely absence of readily available data to make such a
comparison,247 a plaintiff might well have difficulty proving that the
proposed alternative has a smaller discriminatory effect.
would impose FHA liability on a private landlord whose crime-based screening poli-
cies simply mimic those mandated by law for federally assisted housing. See HUD
GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE, supra note 234, at 8.
242. To the extent that the defendant’s concern is that ex-offender tenants would be
more likely to repeat their criminal behavior, some knowledge about recidivism ten-
dencies is relevant. Numerous studies have concluded that recidivism rates, albeit de-
pendent on a number of factors, generally fall dramatically after a certain numbers of
years. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, DISCUSSION
DRAFT NO. 5, at 118 (Apr. 18, 2013) (noting that recidivism rates are relatively low
for first-time parolees, who account for over 40% of prison releases every year); id. at
129–30 (noting “[s]harp decline in prison releasee’s reoffending rates in the months
and years following release” and “the decreasing long-term risks of reoffending for
ex-offenders who have remained crime free for seven to nine years”).
243. See supra note 241.
244. See HUD GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE, supra note 234, at 6–7; cf. 2012
EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 24 (providing similar advice to employers to
avoid Title VII liability).
245. According to a 2005 paper published by the California Apartment Association,
which provided a number of cautions for its members who were considering adding
criminal background checks to their tenant screening process, such a policy:
must be carefully designed and consistently applied . . . . Screening crite-
ria must be narrowly tailored to avoid illegal discrimination, while also
serving the [landlord’s] legitimate business goals . . . . Excluding every
applicant with any criminal background, without regard to the crime and
its relationship to the applicant’s ability to meet tenancy obligations, is
likely to run afoul of fair housing laws.
CAL. APARTMENT ASS’N, supra note 143, at 1. See also Evans v. UDR, Inc., 644 F.
Supp. 2d 675, 678 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (quoting private landlord’s limited crime-
related screening policy).
246. See supra note 29.
247. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text.
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e. Eviction for Domestic Violence Incidents—Sex248
Domestic violence is a serious problem in the United States, one
part of which can be the victim’s loss of housing and resulting home-
lessness.249 One way this may occur is for a landlord to initiate evic-
tion proceedings against a household that is experiencing domestic
violence, with the eviction including the victim as well as the
abuser.250 The first reported FHA decision involving this scenario oc-
curred in 2005 in Bouley v. Young-Sabourin,251 where the court ruled
that the defendant-landlord’s action constituted unlawful sex discrimi-
nation against a female tenant.252
Bouley was an intent-based claim, but an impact-based claim
may be envisioned against a landlord that takes similar action pursuant
to, say, a “zero tolerance for crime” policy, presumably designed to
protect its property or other tenants. Also in recent years, some munic-
ipalities have passed ordinances requiring the eviction of tenants
whose apartments have been the scene of violent incidents or whose
calls for police help are perceived to be excessive.253
In 2011, HUD issued internal guidance on the FHA implications
of these situations, which included the suggestion that a disparate-im-
pact claim might arise “in the context of ‘zero-tolerance’ policies,
under which the entire household is evicted for the criminal activity of
248. The data discussed in this section also reveal grounds for possible race and
national origin claims. See infra note 254.
249. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SAFE HOMES, SAFE COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE
FOR LOCAL LEADERS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND FAIR HOUSING (2015), https://
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/equ15-report-safehomes-v04_0.pdf;
Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), at *21 [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
250. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against
Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2003).
251. 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005).
252. An earlier case based on similar facts was filed in 2001 as a result of the ten-
ant’s FHA complaint to HUD, but this case was settled without a reported opinion.
See Consent Decree, United States ex rel. Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Inc., No. 01-857-
PA (D. Or., Nov. 5, 2001).
253. See Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic
Nuisance Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1187–95 (2008).
For a FHA case challenging such an ordinance as sex-based discrimination, see
Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191-ER (E.D. Pa. amended com-
plaint filed Oct. 10, 2013). The settlement in the Briggs case is available at https://
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2014.09.18_-_release_and_settle
ment_agreement_-_fully_executed.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
As a result of these ordinances, many landlords seek to avoid their sanctions and
eliminate the problem “by evicting the unit’s tenants, including victims of domestic
violence who may need to reach out to police repeatedly due to the conduct of their
abusers [citing authorities].” ACLU Brief, supra note 249, at 26.
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one household member.”254 This guidance stated that “[s]tatistics
show that women are overwhelmingly the victims of domestic vio-
lence [and] that discrimination against victims of domestic violence is
almost always discrimination against women.”255
While this may seem obvious, it will not always be easy to prove
in a particular FHA-impact case. For one thing, the defendant’s policy
would presumably be not just against domestic-violence crimes, but
crime in general (in which case the negatively affected group is much
larger and presumably more gender-diverse). For another, the studies
relied on in HUD’s 2011 guidance are now quite old and reflect na-
tional, as opposed to local, data.256
For example, if a FHA-impact claim were to challenge a “zero
tolerance for crime” policy of a landlord in, say, Lexington, Kentucky,
there seem to be no data sources in this geographic area that provide
gender-based statistical breakdowns for domestic-violence victims.257
Of course, a judge might simply be willing to “notice” that a policy
used to evict domestic-violence victims would disproportionately
254. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement
and Programs, HUD, to FHEO Directors on Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimina-
tion against Victims of Domestic Violence under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 5 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.hud.gov/
offices/fheo/library/11-domestic-violence-memo-with-attachment.pdf.
Such claims, according to this guidance, “are generally based on sex, but may
also involve other protected classes, in particular race or national origin. . . . For
example, African-American and Native American women experience higher rates of
domestic violence than white women [citing a 2004 Bureau of Justice Statistics re-
port].” Id. at 1–2.
255. Id. at 2. In support of this proposition, the HUD guidance cited two 2003 re-
ports, the most pertinent of which was a report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
finding that 85% of victims of domestic violence were women. Id.
256. See id. More recent sources (from 2010–2011) are cited in ACLU Brief, supra
note 249, at *29 n.12, but again these sources are based on only national data. In any
event, those data only reflect incidents of domestic violence reported by the victims,
which is to say a perhaps non-representative sub-group of all domestic-violence
incidents.
257. Email from Diane Follingstad, Director, Univ. of Ky. Ctr. for Research on Vio-
lence Against Women, to Robert G. Schwemm (Feb. 11, 2016) (on file with authors).
The best source would probably be the Kentucky Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
lence (KCADV), which administers and keeps statistics on 15 domestic-violence pro-
grams in the state. See Statistics, KCADV, http://kcadv.org/content/statistics (last
visited Nov. 20, 2016). The statistics reported by the KCADV do give gender-based
breakdowns for those persons served by these programs (e.g., those taken in at the
programs’ shelters), which show an overwhelming majority being female. However,
these data are not broken down by geographic area, nor do they purport to reflect the
overall population of domestic-violence victims in the state or any part thereof.
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harm women,258 but if instead the court required statistical proof of
the kind usually demanded in FHA-impact cases, the plaintiff-tenant
in this type of FHA-impact claim might not be able to establish a
prima facie case.
f. English-Language Requirements—National Origin259
Some landlords require their tenants to speak English or at least
have a household member who does, a screening device that has occa-
sionally been challenged as national origin discrimination.260 The
FHA-impact issue here would be whether an English-language re-
quirement disqualifies members of certain national origins at a signifi-
cantly higher rate than others in the relevant local housing market. As
in the previous example dealing with domestic violence and gender
discrimination, the answer here may seem obvious—that Hispanics
(i.e., those with Spanish-speaking origins) would be disproportion-
ately harmed by this policy—but proving this may not always be easy.
The 1-Year and 5-Year ACS tables provide from 61 to 80 tables
that include data on the language spoken at home. In addition, the
PUMS data provide detailed information that may be helpful in as-
sessing whether particular national origins are likely to be impacted by
258. See supra note 239 (describing case in which courts found that a local-prefer-
ence system used by a predominantly white suburb in a racially mixed metropolitan
area would disproportionately harm blacks).
259. The data discussed in this section may also reveal grounds for possible race,
religion, and disability claims. See HUD, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE
ON FAIR HOUSING ACT PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFI-
CIENCY 2 & n.13 (Sept. 15, 2016), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/hud-
doc?id=lepmemo091516.pdf.
A somewhat related, but clearly distinct, issue would be presented by a national-
origin challenge to a landlord’s requirement of proof of U.S. citizenship or legal resi-
dency (e.g., a Social Security card). See id. at 3 (noting that a “requirement involving
citizenship or immigration status will violate the Act when ‘it has the purpose or
[unjustified] effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin’”); Keller v. City
of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 949 (8th Cir. 2013) (expressing skepticism, in one panel
member’s opinion, about FHA-impact challenge to municipal ordinance that restricted
housing opportunities for aliens not legally in the country which allegedly dispropor-
tionately harmed Latinos).
260. See, e.g., Veles v. Lindow, 243 F.3d 552 (table), 2000 WL 1807851 (9th Cir.
Nov. 1, 2000) (ruling against challenge to landlord’s requirement of one English-
speaker in the household, both because of insufficient evidence of impact and because
defendant’s justification was held sufficient); Cabrera v. Alvarez, 977 F. Supp. 2d 969
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting impact claim but upholding intent claim under the FHA
and upholding intent claim under Title VI against public housing authority’s English-
based rule); see also Nat’l Multi-Housing Council v. Jackson, 539 F. Supp. 2d 425
(D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting housing providers’ challenge to HUD’s Title VI guidance
(Jan. 22, 2007) regarding tenants with Limited-English-Proficiency).
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an English-language requirement.261 The PUMS data include variables
designed to identify both persons and households where people have a
limited proficiency in English.262 The PUMS variables also include
questions on the language spoken at home, citizenship, immigrant sta-
tus, ancestry, Hispanic or Latino origin, and race. These variables can
be combined with any of the other housing or population variables to
create comparison groups. Using the 5-Year PUMS data in these cases
would allow basing the groupings and estimates on the largest possi-
ble sample.
B. Zoning Restrictions on Housing Developments
Zoning and other land-use policies define where and how hous-
ing may be built. Among other things, these policies directly affect the
cost of housing. This, in turn, may restrict the ability of developers to
provide affordable units of particular importance to racial minorities
or other protected classes, thus creating potential FHA disparate-im-
pact claims.263 The situations discussed in this section may also in-
clude issues of residential segregation, which often relate to
differences in the respective income levels of blacks and Hispanics
compared to whites.
We examine below three zoning hypotheticals of increasing com-
plexity. The use of actual places demonstrates how different sources
261. For a description of the PUMS data, see supra Part II.A.2.
262. The PUMS definition of the variable for defining limited English speaking
households is:
This variable identifies households that may need English-language assis-
tance. A “Limited English speaking household” is one in which no mem-
ber 14 years old and over (1) speaks only English at home or (2) speaks a
language other than English at home and speaks English “Very well.”
After data are collected for each person in the household, this variable is
calculated by checking if all people 14 years old and older speak a lan-
guage other than English. If so, the calculation checks the English-speak-
ing ability responses to see if all people 14 years old and older speak
English “Less than ‘very well.’” If all household members 14 and over
speak a language other than English and speak English “Less than ‘very
well,’” the household is considered part of this group that may be in need
of English language assistance. All members of a household were in-
cluded in this group, including members under 14 years old who may
have spoken only English.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY AND PUERTO RICO COMMU-
NITY SURVEY: 2014 SUBJECT DEFINITIONS 46 (2014).
263. While these examples show how disparate-impact claims should be analyzed,
the analysis may also serve in some cases to support intent-based claims by showing
that the defendant’s action caused a significant race-based disparity. See supra note
34 para. 2 (noting that evidence of disparate impact may show intentional
discrimination).
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of data may be needed to measure a zoning change’s disparate impact
on racial minorities. Based on the scenarios’ differences, each is found
to be best analyzed by using a different data source.
1. Zoning that Limits Multifamily Housing
Assume that a city (say Newport News, Virginia) re-zones a large
segment of undeveloped land from a residential category that allows
both single-family housing (one–two units) and a range of multifamily
housing (defined as 3–49 units) to a category that allows only single-
family.
a. Identifying the Affected Group and Groups to be
Compared
As in all disparate-impact analyses, the first step is to identify the
group that is harmed by this zoning change. Here, this would be all
households that live in buildings defined by the city’s zoning code as
multifamily structures. Separating these households according to
whether they rent or own is not necessary, because the zoning change
affects the number of units in a structure, not the type of ownership
(e.g., under the pre-change zoning, all of the area could be built with
multifamily units that are owned condominiums or rental units).
To determine whether the zoning change has a disparate impact
on blacks first requires an identification of the city’s racial make-up.
In the case of Newport News, the city is mostly white (53.9%), but
with a large black population (42.3%).264
b. Identifying the Best Data Source
Census Bureau data provide race-based information on the num-
ber of units in the structures where people currently live. Because the
focus here is only on households’ race and the number of units in the
structures where they live, the Bureau’s ACS preformatted tables are
sufficient; that is, they provide a breakdown of the number of units in
the structure separately for blacks and whites, and therefore the addi-
tional detailed information provided in the PUMS data is not
needed.265 For Newport News, the ACS’s Tables B25032B and
B25032H for 2014 provide these data for, respectively, households
264. See American Community Survey 2014 1-Year Estimates, Table DP05 - “ACS
Demographic and Housing Estimates,” City of Newport News (figures are for race
alone or in combination).
265. For descriptions of the ACS and PUMS data, see supra Part II.A.
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that are black (alone) and white (alone and not Hispanic).266 This al-
lows for a straightforward comparison of the percentage of black and
white households that live in structures with three or more units.
c. Measuring the Racial Disparity
The relevant ACS tables estimate that 41.62% of the 28,215
black households live in structures with 3–49 units, while 18.84% of
the 32,960 white households live in such structures. Using the Census
Bureau’s instructions for calculating standard errors from these data,
the Z-score for the test for statistically significant differences in these
percentages is 5.15, which is well beyond what is required for a 99%
confidence level.
Thus, the disparity ratio is 2.21 (41.62% ÷ 18.84%), which means
that black households are more than twice as likely to live in these
structures compared to whites and which is large enough to establish
an actionable disparate impact.267 The situation here is one where the
ACS data fit the case’s facts and enable an analysis that proves a
prima facie case of disparate impact.
2. Zoning that Raises the Cost of Rental Housing
Here, assume that a municipality changes the height limits for
multifamily construction, so that an apartment developer cannot build
as many units on the site and will therefore have to increase monthly
rents from, say, $700–$900 to $1,100–$1,300 for two-bedroom units
and from $900–$1,100 to $1,500–$1,700 for three-bedroom units.
a. Identifying the Affected Group and Groups to be
Compared
The affected households are those that rent two- and three-bed-
room units in the lower rent ranges that would have been charged
under the prior height limits. The increase in housing costs restricts
their opportunities in the market, while households that rent at the
higher rents projected after the change would have an increased sup-
ply of housing.
266. Comparable preformatted tables are provided for other racial groups and for
Hispanics and provide data based on selected ranges for the number of units in a
structure. These ranges may not always fit the definitions for a particular zoning code;
if not, the PUMS data might be used, at least if the geographic areas for PUMS align
reasonably well with the municipal boundaries within which the zoning policy ap-
plies. For a description of this element of the PUMS data, see supra notes 116–17 and
accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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Again using Newport News as an example, the Census Bureau
data on income ranges by race indicate that whites typically have
higher incomes than blacks.268 Because differences in income will
likely reflect differences in the ability to pay increased rents, the com-
parison groups are black and white rental households.
b. Identifying the Best Data Source
The principal method for measuring disparate impact requires
comparison of the percentages of white and black renter households
that pay rent in certain ranges.269 The ACS’s preformatted tables do
not provide data on rent levels by race or ethnicity. However, the
PUMS data do identify households by race and rent levels, specifically
for two- and three-bedroom units.
PUMS areas (“PUMAs”) often match whole counties and may
roughly match large cities, but they typically do not match the bound-
aries of smaller municipalities. In this case, Newport News is an
independent city that is not within a county.270 PUMAs for these Vir-
ginia independent cities may match, or roughly match, the boundaries
of a city when it has a population of 100,000 or more. For Newport
News, the municipal boundaries align with a single PUMA.271 There-
fore, the PUMS data may be used here.
c. Measuring the Racial Disparity
The goal in this case is to measure the zoning change’s compara-
tive impact on black-versus-white renter households that pay the rele-
vant rents. The first test compares the percentage of black renters who
pay rents at the lower ranges for two- and three-bedroom units to the
comparable percentage of white renters who pay rents at the higher
ranges for these units. Estimates from the PUMS data indicate that
Newport News has 17,904 black renter households, 3,915 of whom
pay rents of $700–$900 for two-bedroom units or $900–$1,100 for
three bedroom units; that is 21.87% (3,915 ÷ 17,904) of all black rent-
ers. As for the higher projected rents, the PUMS data estimate that
1,001 black renters pay $1,100–$1,300 for two-bedroom units or
268. See the 2014 ACS 1-Year data on income by race for Newport News, Table
B19101B for blacks and Table B19101H for whites.
269. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
270. See generally History of Consolidation, NEWPORT NEWS, VA., https://www.nn
va.gov/282/History-of-Consolidation (last visited Nov. 22, 2016).
271. Had the PUMS data not matched the city of Newport News, one might use
different combinations of PUMS data for areas in and around the city to verify that the
disparities are not peculiar to the finite boundaries of this one municipality.
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$1,500–$1,700 for three-bedroom units; that is 5.59% (1,001 ÷
17,904). Following the Census Bureau’s instructions for calculating
standard errors for the PUMS data, the Z-Score is 5.06, well above the
level required for a 99% level of confidence. The disparity ratio is
3.91 (21.87% ÷ 5.59%), indicating that black households are almost
four times as likely to pay rent in the lower ranges than in the higher
ranges.
The question is whether this disparity is greater for blacks than
whites. The PUMS data estimate that Newport News has 10,852 white
renter households, 1,591 of whom pay rents of $700–$900 for two-
bedroom units or $900–$1,100 for three-bedroom units; that is
14.66% (1,591 ÷ 10,852) of all white renters. For the higher rents, the
PUMS data estimate that 1,189 white renters pay rents of
$1,100–$1,300 for two-bedroom units or $1,500–$1,700 for three-
bedroom units; that is 10.96% (1,189 ÷ 10,852). However, the statisti-
cal test for significant differences in these percentages produces a Z-
Score of only 0.9, which is well below what is required for even a
95% level of confidence. Therefore, it cannot be shown that there is a
statistically significant difference in the percentages of white renters
based on the change in the rent levels.
Another option is to compare the net percentages of black and
white households impacted by the zoning change. For both white and
black renters, the percentage of households that rent at the lower
ranges is greater than the percentage that rents at the higher levels.
The difference between the percentage that rent at the lower ranges
and the higher ranges is the net percentage of households impacted by
the change.
This net change for black renter households is 16.28% (21.87%
at the low ranges minus 5.59% at the high ranges). The comparable
figure for whites is 3.70% (14.66% at the low ranges minus 10.96% at
the high ranges). The test for the differences in these percentages pro-
duces a Z-Score of 4.19, well above the level required for a 99% level
of confidence. The disparity ratio is 4.40 (16.28% ÷ 3.70%), indicat-
ing that black households are harmed by the zoning change at a rate
more than four times that for whites and satisfying the standards for
showing a sufficiently large disparate impact.272 This example shows
that there may be more than one way to test for a disparate impact,
although each must fit the case’s facts and they may not all produce a
statistically significant measure of impact.
272. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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3. Zoning that Raises the Cost of Homeownership
Assume that a suburb of 25,000 people in a metropolitan area
rezones a large undeveloped parcel of land zoned for single-family
housing to require larger lot sizes. With the prior lot sizes, developers
in the area have been building single-family homes that sell in the
range of $170,000 to $225,000. Because of the cost of land, develop-
ers are now proposing that the new homes will sell in the
$230,000–$285,000 range. This situation is similar to the rental case
just discussed, but here the zoning change affects home prices rather
than rents.
a. Identifying the Affected Group and Groups to be
Compared
The affected households are those that purchase homes in the
lower price range prior to the zoning change. The increase in housing
costs restricts their opportunities in the market, while households that
purchase homes at the higher price range projected after the zoning
change would have an increased supply of housing.
Minneapolis provides an example of a metropolitan area with rel-
atively small minority populations. Black households account for 17%
of the 169,306 households in Minneapolis and about 11% of the
493,219 households in the larger Hennepin County area where the city
is located.273 As was true for Newport News in the previous example,
black incomes tend to be lower than white incomes for both Minneap-
olis and Hennepin County.274 Moreover, homeownership levels for
blacks are much lower than for whites: in Minneapolis, about 21% of
black households are owners, while 58% of the white households are;
in Hennepin County, 24% of black households are owners, while 71%
of the white households are. Viewed in terms of their share of the
homeownership market, blacks represent just over 7% in Minneapolis
and about 4% in Hennepin County.275
Are black households disproportionately harmed by this zoning
change? Because the change affects home-sale prices, the base com-
parison groups should be taken from the market of those households
that are owners. As with the Newport News rental example, the dis-
parities to be tested are based on the differences in the share of black
273. See the 2014 ACS 1-Year data on housing tenure and race for Minneapolis and
for Hennepin County, Table B25003 for all households, Table B25003B for black
households, and Table B25003H for white households.
274. See the 2014 ACS 1-Year data on income by race for Minneapolis and for
Hennepin County, Table B19101B for blacks, and Table B19101H for whites.
275. See supra notes 273–74.
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and white homeowners that live at properties in the price ranges
before and after the rezoning. Moreover, in order to make a reasonable
estimate of the home-buying market in the near future, the comparison
groups should also be focused as much as possible on current housing
prices and conditions.
A market area must be identified. The area needs to be large
enough to provide a sound profile of existing housing patterns for the
comparisons, but the suburb here has only 25,000 persons. Given the
small size of the black homeownership market, a larger area is re-
quired in order to show race-based market patterns. The Census Bu-
reau data on homeownership by race used thus far indicate that about
half of the black homeowners live in Minneapolis and the rest live
outside the city in the suburbs of Hennepin County. While one might
want to select multiple areas to test for the consistency of the results,
Hennepin County will serve as the market area for the following
analysis.
b. Identifying the Best Data Source
When the case involves a relatively small protected-class popula-
tion, finding a proper data source may be problematic. The PUMS
data contain codes for homeownership, race, the value of the home,
and the year that the household moved in. At first glance, this would
appear to provide the match needed to compare white and black
households that purchased homes recently by the value of those
properties.
There are 10 PUMS areas that fall within the boundaries of Hen-
nepin County. Collectively, the 1-Year 2014 PUMS data for these
PUMAs provide a large sample to work with. These data estimate that
1,101 black households own their homes and moved in within the last
two years, 144 of whom have homes in the $170,000–$225,000 range
and 262 of whom have homes in the $230,000–$285,000 range.
A problem arises, however, because the PUMS estimates are
based on weights assigned to individual households using a complex
sampling design.276 In this case, there was only one respondent house-
hold with a weight of 144 units that produced the data for the low
range and only two respondents that produced the estimate for the
higher range. With estimates based on so few respondents, the PUMS
data are not reliable enough to support a disparate-impact analysis.
276. The more respondents in the sample, the more accurate the estimates should be.
The more detailed the screening process, however, the fewer the number of individual
respondents that are used for the estimate for the screened group.
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Although the base of respondents can be increased by using multiple
years of PUMS data, this would introduce data from less recent home-
market conditions and still might not guarantee a more reliable esti-
mate for small groups.
Fortunately, there is another data-source option—the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).277 HMDA data provide annual re-
ports that include the loans originated for home purchases with codes
for race, ethnicity, and the value of the loans. The data are not a sam-
ple, but report every individual loan made by a covered lender with
codes for the state, county, and census tract for the loan.278
There may be some problems, however, with using the HMDA
data. One is that these data do not include home purchases unless they
involve mortgage loans (e.g., cash purchases are not reported), but this
may be accounted for.279 Another issue with the HMDA data is that
they report the loan amount, but not the sale price. Different types of
loans (conventional, FHAdm-insured, and VA) typically have differ-
ent limits on the loan to-value-ratio (“LTV”). These differences can be
accounted for either by marking up the loans to an estimated sale price
differently for each type of loan based on market conditions and in-
dustry reports, or by using a series of different levels of markups and
testing each one to ensure that these differences do not substantially
affect the disparate-impact analysis.
The illustration here uses a single markup of the HMDA loans
applied to the combined HMDA data for Hennepin County for 2013
and 2014. The HMDA data indicate that about 77% of the loans are
conventional loans, which generally have LTVs of 80% or less, and
about 23% of the loans are FHAdm-insured or VA, which often have
277. For a description of HMDA, see supra Part II.B.
278. As discussed in Part II.B, the vast majority of, but not all, mortgage lenders are
required to report HMDA data; there are also some exemptions for reporting race and
ethnicity data. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
279. The effect of this gap may be estimated where there are available data from the
real estate sales industry on cash sales. The PUMS data can provide some estimates
from the full market, because these data have codes for owners that have a mortgage
and those that do not. The level of cash sales might be estimated by reviewing the
percentage of owner households that moved into their homes in the last two years with
and without a mortgage. Overall, the 2014 PUMS data estimate that 22% of these
homeowners do not have a mortgage. The rate appears to be lower for lower priced
homes: about 17% of the owners with home-values in the $170,000–$225,000 did not
have a mortgage, while a comparable figure for owners with values over $300,000 is
estimated at 29%. Thus, these data indicate that home purchases using mortgage loans
represent roughly 80% of the overall market, while cash sales are more common for
higher priced home sales.
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LTVs above 90%. The calculations below assume an overall LTV of
about 85% and mark up the HMDA data to estimate the sales price.280
c. Measuring the Racial Disparity
The HMDA data on individual originations report 29,746 first-
lien home purchase loans for owner-occupants in Hennepin County.
Of these loans, 23,701 (79.68%) were to whites, and 1,004 (3.38%) to
blacks. The data for the 1,004 black loans allow a reasonable estimate
of the share of blacks who recently purchased homes in the value
ranges at issue here.
The HMDA data indicate that 319 (31.77%) of the black loans
and 5,023 (21.19%) of the white loans were for home prices estimated
to be in the lower range of $170,000–$225,000. These differences are
statistically significant at more than the 99% level.281 The disparity
ratio is 1.50 (31.77% ÷ 21.19%).
As for higher priced houses, the HMDA data indicate that 135
(13.45%) of the black loans and 4,062 (17.14%) of the white loans
were for home prices estimated to be in the higher range of
$230,000–$285,000. These differences are also statistically significant
at more than the 99% level. However, the disparity ratio here is only
0.78 (13.45% ÷ 17.14%), which means that a greater proportion of
whites are likely to purchase in this higher range than blacks.
Still, the percentages of both whites and blacks purchasing homes
in this higher range are smaller than their respective percentages at the
lower price range. As with the Newport News rental example, one can
calculate the percentages of black and white purchasers who would be
less likely to purchase at the higher range to see if this difference is
significant. The data show that 184 (18.33%) of the black purchasers
would be adversely affected and 961 (4.05%) of the white purchasers
would be. These differences are statistically significant at well above
the 99% level. The disparity ratio is thus 4.52 (18.33% ÷ 4.05%), indi-
cating that blacks are more than four times as likely to be adversely
affected by the zoning change than whites.
***
The three zoning-change examples dealt with in this section
demonstrate that there are different methods and different sets of data
280. In a formal disparate-impact assessment, one would likely want to apply more
than one markup estimate.
281. Although the HMDA data are not technically samples that require statistical
tests for differences, subjecting this data to such a test does provide a more conserva-
tive approach and allows for some random error in reporting.
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that may be used in FHA-impact challenges to evaluate various types
of zoning policies. Each data set has strengths and limitations. Where
possible, FHA plaintiffs would be well advised to experiment with
multiple approaches that apply more than one method of analysis and
more than one source of data.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities upheld
impact claims under the Fair Housing Act and thereby sought to
strengthen the FHA’s role in integrating American society by remov-
ing artificial barriers to minorities’ housing choices. Along with
HUD’s 2013 regulation endorsing FHA-impact claims, the Inclusive
Communities decision is likely to unleash a wide variety of legal chal-
lenges to housing-limiting policies of landlords, municipalities, mort-
gage lenders, and others that disproportionately harm FHA-protected
classes.
These claims are governed by a three-step burden-shifting ap-
proach, the first of which requires a plaintiff to prove that the defen-
dant’s policy causes disproportionate harm to a racial minority or
other protected class. Inclusive Communities mandates that plaintiffs’
claims in this first stage be carefully scrutinized and, if not based on
appropriate statistical evidence, dismissed before trial.
This Article provides guidance for what such evidence should
entail. After identifying the appropriate legal precedents and key data
sources, we show through examples how to properly analyze the most
important types of FHA-impact claims, such as those involving land-
lords’ screening devices and those challenging local governments’ re-
strictions on affordable housing. In working through these examples,
we also suggest a generalized method for developing and presenting
FHA-impact evidence that identifies the necessary steps for establish-
ing a prima facie case and the methods for handling the various
sources of relevant data.
The impact theory of liability endorsed by Inclusive Communities
creates both great possibilities and great challenges for FHA litigation.
As this Article shows, given the appropriate legal and statistical prin-
ciples and the data available, certain types of these claims may be hard
to prove. Thus, while the promise of Inclusive Communities—that
FHA-impact claims can help break down arbitrary barriers to a more
integrated society and enhance housing choice for all Americans—is
possible to fulfill, it will take serious effort by those seeking to litigate
these claims.
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APPENDIX A:
WHEN USING ABSOLUTE (RAW) NUMBERS
MAY BE APPROPRIATE
A fundamental principle in disparate-impact cases is that the dis-
parities shown should result from comparing the proportions of the
groups affected by the defendant’s challenged policy and not simply
the raw numbers.282 The table below shows why this is important. It
presents three comparisons of the differences in the affected minority
and white households. In both Sample #1 and Sample #2, 35% of the
minority households and 25% of the white households are affected,
thus producing a disparity ratio of 1.4 (35% ÷ 25%), which is proba-
bly high enough to establish an actionable FHA-impact claim.283 Yet
in each case, the actual number of white households affected is greater
(50 white versus 35 minority in Sample #1; 500 white versus 350 mi-
nority in Sample #2).
 
Sample #1 Sample #2 Sample #3
Number of Minority Households Affected 35 350 350,000
Total Minority Households 100 1,000 1,000,000
Percent Affected 35% 35% 35.0%
Number of White Households Affected 50 500 690,000
Total White Households 200 2,000 2,000,000
Percent Affected 25% 25% 34.5%
Disparity Ratio (Minority % / White %) 1.40 1.40 1.01
Difference in Proportion Test Z-Score 1.81 5.73 8.58
Test Value Required for Statistical Significance 1.96 1.96 1.96
Differences Statistically Different? NO YES YES
Minority Households Affected at White Rate 25 250 345,000
Difference Based on Actual Minority Rate 10 100 5,000
Test of Differences in Population Percentages and Numbers Affected
However, there are situations where considering raw numbers
along with percentages may be important in assessing a FHA-impact
claim. For example, in Sample #1, the Z-Score that measures the level
of differences in the proportions statistically is only 1.81, when a
value of at least 1.96 is required for the 95% confidence level that is
typically sought.284 Moreover, a defendant or court may object that,
282. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. On the other hand, slight
changes in the base numbers for small samples can make a large difference in the
statistical test results. Had just one more minority household been affected by the
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because so few households are adversely affected, the differences are
inconsequential.285 In responding to such an objection, it is important
to select the appropriate raw numbers to review. Because at least some
members of every group being compared are usually affected by the
challenged policy, the issue might become whether the additional
number of minority households affected in this example is enough to
justify a FHA claim.
The table’s second-to-last row calculates the number of minority
households that would be affected if the proportion of minority house-
holds were equal to the proportion of white households affected (i.e.,
there is no disparity). The difference between this number and the esti-
mate of the actual number of minority households affected represents
the estimate for the actual number of households that account for the
disparity. If the white and minority households were equally affected
at the white rate, then 25 minority households would be affected, in-
stead of the sample data’s indication that 35 minority households were
affected. Thus, the difference that accounts for the 1.40 disparity ratio
is only 10 minority households (35-25).
In an absolute sense, this number—10 households—is small, yet
it represents 10% of all the minority households in the sample. Given
the small size of the total minority population in Sample #1, the 10
households that account for the disparity may or may not justify a
FHA claim. In Sample #2, by contrast, the minority households, which
again account for 10% of the minority population and again yield a 1.4
disparity ratio, represent 100 households (i.e., ten times as many as in
Sample #1), thus perhaps justifying a FHA claim.
Sample #3 represents a related, but more complicated, set of is-
sues. The test here shows the highest level of statistical significance of
all the examples, but this is largely the result of the sample’s size. The
actual proportions affected in Sample #3 are similar for both blacks
and whites (i.e., 35.0% and 34.5%, respectively), so that the disparity
ratio is only 1.01 (35.0%% ÷ 34.5%), which is well below the thresh-
old for an actionable difference. On the other hand, the 5,000 minority
households that account for the disparity is large, perhaps enough so
to justify a FHA claim.
In sum, while there is no simple test or rule upon which to rely in
all circumstances, a proper evaluation of the data may require consid-
eration of the raw numbers, as well as the percentages, that account
policy, the statistical test score would have been 1.99, which is just above the level
needed for statistical significance at the 95% confidence level.
285. See, e.g., Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286
(11th Cir. 2006).
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for the disparities in order to anticipate critical issues in FHA-impact
cases.286
286. Any use of raw numbers should consider the case’s context. For example, the
number of Section 8 households in a particular apartment complex that might be elim-
inated as a result of a defendant’s challenged policy may appear to be an insignificant
number compared to all of the households in the local rental market, but they are
likely to represent a much larger share of all of the existing Section 8 voucher holders.
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APPENDIX B:
FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPACT CALCULATIONS BASED ON
ALTERNATIVE COMPARISON METHODS
(DISPROPORTIONATE ADVERSE IMPACT AND DISPROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION)
As described in Part I.C.2.b,287 the two most common methods of
comparison used to evaluate how a defendant’s challenged policy af-
fects different groups in FHA-impact cases are: (1) comparing the pro-
portion of a protected class that is affected (e.g., Hispanics) with that
of a control population that is affected (e.g., whites), which is some-
times called “disproportionate adverse impact”; and (2) comparing the
protected class’s share of those affected by the policy to its share of
the general population, which is sometimes called “disproportional
representation.” The former produces the same results regardless of
how many other groups are in the full population, but the results of the
disproportional representation method may vary depending upon: (1)
the presence of other groups in the general population; and (2) differ-
ent approaches to defining the proportion of the protected class af-
fected by the policy. The following pair of tables illustrate this point.
 
Hispanic White Black Total Hispanic White Black Total
Affected 4,000 15,000 0 19,000 Affected 4,000 15,000 40,000 59,000
Not Affected 16,000 135,000 0 151,000 Not Affected 16,000 135,000 40,000 191,000
Total 20,000 150,000 0 170,000 Total 20,000 150,000 80,000 250,000
% of All 
Hispanics that 
Are Affected
20% 20%
% of All 
Hispanics that 
Are Affected
20% 7%
% of All 
Whites that 
Are Affected
10% 12%
%  of the 
Population 
that Is 
Hispanic
8% 8%
Disparity Ratio 2.0 Disparity Ratio 1.7 Disparity Ratio 2.5 Disparity Ratio 0.8
Disproportionate
 Adverse Impact
%  of the 
Population that 
Is Hispanic
% of the 
Population that Is 
Hispanic
Disproportional Disproportional
Representation Version 1 Representation Version 2 Representation Version 3
Disproportional
% of All 
Hispanics that 
Are Affected
% of Total 
Affected that Are 
Hispanic
Disproportionate Adverse Impact and Version 1 of 
Disproportional Representation Calculations
Version 2 and Version 3 of Disproportional 
Representation Calculations
The table on the left assumes a city of 170,000 households with
Hispanics and whites, but no blacks. The disproportionate adverse im-
pact method in this table compares the proportion of Hispanics af-
fected by the policy (4,000 out of 20,000 households = 20%) to the
proportion of white households affected (15,000 out of 150,000 house-
287. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
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holds = 10%). Dividing the Hispanic percentage by the white percent-
age, the disparity ratio is 2.0 (20% ÷ 10% = 2.0). This table also
shows a version of the disproportional representation calculation for
this city. This version compares the proportion of Hispanics affected
by the policy (4,000 out of 20,000 households = 20%) to the propor-
tion of Hispanics in the total population (20,000 ÷ 170,000 = 12%).
Dividing the affected Hispanic percentage by the percentage of His-
panics in the population, the disparity ratio is 1.7 (20% ÷ 12% = 1.7
(1.67 rounded to one decimal)).
The table on the right presents the same data for Hispanics and
whites, but adding 80,000 blacks to the population. Version 2 of the
disproportional representation shows that the existence of an addi-
tional population affects the impact calculation. The share of the total
population that is Hispanic is now reduced to 8% from 12%. This
increases the disparity ratio to 2.5 (20% ÷ 8% = 2.5).
Finally, the table on the right presents an additional version of the
disproportional representation method that measures the percentage of
all affected households that are Hispanic. In this case, the number of
affected Hispanics is divided by the number of all households affected
by the challenged policy. The calculation is 4,000 affected Hispanic
households ÷ 59,000 total affected households = 7% (6.78% rounded
to the nearest percentage). When compared to the percentage of His-
panics in the general population, the disparity ratio is 0.8 (6.78% ÷ 8%
= 0.8% (8.48% rounded to the nearest percentage)). Here, the calcula-
tions are affected by both the addition of the black population and the
share of the black population that is also affected by the policy. Again,
however, the disproportionate adverse impact calculation disparity ra-
tio remains the same (2.0), because it is based purely on the percent-
ages of Hispanics and whites affected regardless of the impact on any
other groups that might exist in the general population.
In sum, the disproportional representation calculations are sensi-
tive to the number of different groups in the population as well as the
precise way that the proportion of affected protected class members is
defined. In this case, different measures produced disparity ratios that
vary from 0.8 to 2.5. Thus, when using this method, one needs to be
sure that it fits the particulars of the case involved and also take ac-
count of the different outcomes related to different versions of the
measure.
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APPENDIX C:
TRANSLATING TITLE VII’S 4/5 RULE TO A 5/4 RULE
FOR FHA CASES
This appendix provides an analysis of the mathematical relation-
ship between assessing the size of disparity ratios based on the selec-
tion-rate method (commonly used in Title VII cases) versus the
rejection-rate method (commonly used in FHA cases).288
The Title VII selection-rate method compares the success rates of
different groups in passing an employment test, with the question be-
ing whether a protected class has a significantly lower success rate
than a control group’s rate. A rule of thumb for determining signifi-
cance is that the protected class’s rate is less than 4/5 (0.80) that of the
control group. On the other hand, FHA cases typically compare rela-
tive rejection rates, with the question being whether the rejection rate
for the protected class is greater than the rate for others. Thus, the
comparison in FHA cases typically uses rejection rates and calculates
the inverse of the ratio used in Title VII cases.
Therefore, one way to apply Title VII’s measure of significance
to FHA cases is to invert (or reverse) the 4/5 ratio used for selection
rates and use a 5/4 ratio (1.25) for rejection rates, with a disparity ratio
of 1.25 or more indicating an actionable difference.289 Inverting the 4/
5 rule maintains the dynamics of the relationship in Title VII cases
that has been accepted by the courts. Mathematically, whenever the
selection rate for blacks is equal to or less than 0.8 times that of
whites, the inverse ratio of the selection rates for whites to blacks will
be equal to or greater than 1.25.290
288. For descriptions of these methods, see supra notes 84–86 and accompanying
text.
289. For illustrations, in addition to those discussed in the remainder of this Appen-
dix, see supra note 94 para. 2 (illustrating Title VII’s 4/5 rule) and note 97 para. 2
(illustrating the rejection-rate-ratio used in FHA cases).
290. This approach also provides an additional way of assessing the disparities in a
FHA case. The disparity ratio—beyond its use to measure the size of the disparities—
may be valuable on its own in situations where the samples used in the statistical test
are so small that they may mask a large difference in affected proportions of the two
groups being compared. For example, consider the data for Sample #1 in the table in
Appendix A. Based on very small samples, the test shows no statistically significant
difference in the proportions of white and minority households affected. However, the
disparity ratio for these samples is 1.40, which exceeds the 1.25 standard and thus
would indicate a significant difference based on the parallel approach used in Title
VII cases. Using this disparity ratio as a supplemental measure provides some addi-
tional support for demonstrating a significant disparate impact, especially when anom-
alies in the standard statistical tests limit their ability to assess the disparities.
On the other hand, where extremely large samples indicate a statistically signifi-
cant disparity, the disparity ratio may temper that finding. Here consider Sample #3 in
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The following table presents the calculations that show the rela-
tionship between Title VII’s 4/5 rule and the 5/4 inversion of this rule
for FHA cases.
 
Col. A Col. B Col. C Col. D (Col. A / Col. C) (Col. C / Col. A) (Col. B / Col. D) (Col. D / Col. B)
Row 1 72 / 28 90 / 10
Row 2 60 / 40 75 / 25
Row 3 40 / 60 50 / 50
Row 4 20 / 80 25 / 75
Row 5 8 / 92 10 / 90
Col. A Col. B Col. C Col. D (Col. A /Col. C) (Col. C / Col. A) (Col. B / Col. D) (Col. D / Col. B)
Row 1 90 / 10 72 / 28
Row 2 75 / 25 60 / 40
Row 3 50 / 50 40 / 60
Row 4 25 / 75 20 / 80
Row 5 10 / 90 8 / 92
Sample Selection and Rejection Rates
Select / Reject Select / Reject
Black / White White / Black Black / White White / BlackBlacks Whites
Selection Rate Selection Rate
Ratios Ratios Rate Ratios
Residual Rejection Residual Rejection
0.8 1.25 2.80 0.36
Rate Ratios
0.8 1.25 1.60 0.63
0.8 1.25 1.20 0.83
0.8 1.25 1.07 0.94
0.8 1.25 1.02 0.98
Reversing the Selection and Rejection Rates for Blacks and Whites
Reject / Select Reject / Select
Black / White White / Black
Rate Ratios Rate RatiosRatios Ratios
Blacks Whites
Rejection Rate Rejection Rate Residual Selection Residual Selection
1.25 0.8 0.36 2.80
1.25 0.8 0.63 1.60
1.25 0.8 0.83 1.20
1.25 0.8 0.94 1.07
Black / White White / Black
1.25 0.8 0.98 1.02
The data in Rows 1–5 in the top section of the table to the left of
the gray bar demonstrate the selection rates in a Title VII context us-
ing the 4/5 rule where selection rates are the points of the compari-
son.291 In each of these five examples, there are a total of 200
applicants (100 blacks and 100 whites). The ratios of the black-to-
white selection rates are all 0.8 (i.e., the disparities exactly meet the 4/
5 rule), and, conversely, the white-to-black selection ratios are all
1.25.
The data in the top section of the table to the right of the gray bar
reveal an important anomaly that Professors Paetzold and Willborn
have pointed out concerning applying the 5/4 rule to the residual rejec-
tion rate data where the Title VII rule relates to the comparison of
the table in Appendix A, the data for which are based on large samples and indicate an
extremely high level of statistically significant differences in the percentages of mi-
nority and white households affected. These differences, however, are the result of the
large size of the samples and reflect a disparity ratio of only 1.01, which indicates an
almost identical proportional effect on each group. In this case, one might rely on the
difference in the raw number of minorities affected to support a FHA prima facie
case, as discussed in Appendix A.
291. The data in Rows 1–5 are taken from PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 73, at
370 (Table 8.1).
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selection rates.292 The results for the residual rejection rates do not
reflect the same fixed relationships found for selection rates; that is,
the black-to-white ratios are not 1.25 and the white-to-black ratios are
not 0.8. Indeed, each set of ratios is different.
This indicates that the fixed mathematical relationship related to
the comparison of selection rates in not symmetrical. Rather, in Title
VII cases, it is a one-way relationship that only works when applied to
selection rates. While all of the five examples meet the 4/5 rule for
substantive differences when comparing selection rates, three of the
five examples (indicated within the dotted line box) fail to meet the 5/
4 rule for a ratio of 1.25 or more if one used the residual rejection
rates for blacks versus whites. Conversely, these same three examples
would fail to meet the less-than-80% standard for the white to black
rejection rates.293
The bottom table exchanges the data for whites and blacks and
changes the selection rates to rejection rates. Here, the rejection rates
are the points of comparison. The black-to-white rejection ratios are
now 1.25, and all of the white-to-black rejection ratios are 0.8, con-
firming that the 5/4 rule applied to rejection rates in housing cases
represents the same mathematical relationship as the 4/5 rule for selec-
tion rates in employment cases. Of course, the same anomaly applies
to the calculations for the ratios of the residual selection rates in hous-
ing cases. The same three examples in the dotted line box in the lower
section of the table fail to meet the less-than-80% standard when com-
paring black to white selection rates. Conversely, these same three
examples also fail to meet the 1.25-or-greater standard when compar-
ing white to black selection rates.
This does not negate the use of either the 4/5 rule in Title VII
cases or the 5/4 rule in FHA cases. It does, however, caution against
applying the tests to anything other than measures for which the tests
were designed. The logic for the Title VII tests is based on measuring
the likelihood that different groups will achieve a positive outcome,
while the measure for FHA cases is designed to assess the extent to
which different groups will suffer an adverse outcome.
292. Id.
293. Note that while the residual rejection rates do not match the identical 0.8 and
1.25 ratios for the selection rates, the residual rejection rate ratios do fit the same
relative inverse relationship. That is, whenever the black-to-white residual rejection
ratios are greater than 1.25, the white-to-black residual rejection ratios are less than
0.8 (Rows 1 and 2). Conversely, whenever the black-to-white residual rejection ratios
are less than 1.25, the white-to-black residual rejection ratios are greater than 0.8
(Rows 3, 4, and 5).
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APPENDIX D:
PUMS 2014 SUBJECT LIST
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APPENDIX E:
HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT (HMDA) LOAN/
APPLICATION REGISTER CODE SHEET
 
 Respondent ID: 10 Character Identifier Loan Type:
 Agency: 1—Conventional (any loan other than FHA,VA,
1— Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) FSA, or RHS loans)
2— Federal Reserve System (FRS) 2— FHA-insured (Federal Housing Administration)
3— Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) VA-guaranteed (Veterans Administration)
5— National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 3— FSA/RHS (Farm Service Agency or Rural
7— Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Housing Services)
9— Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Property Type:
 Geographic Identifier 1— One to four-family (other than manufactured housing)
MSA/MD: Metropolitan Statistical Area/Metropolitan Division 2— Manufactured housing
State: Two-digit FIPS state identifier 3— Multifamily
County: Three-digit FIPS county identifier Purpose of Loan:
Tract: Census tract number 1— Home purchase
 Applicant Information 2— Home improvement
 Ethnicity: 3— Refinancing
1— Hispanic or Latino Owner-Occupancy:
2— Not Hispanic or Latino 1— Owner-occupied as a principal dwelling
3— Information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or 2— Not owner-occupied
        telephone application 3— Not applicable
4— Not applicable Preapproval (home purchase loans only):
5— No co-applicant 1— Preapproval was requested
 Race: 2— Preapproval was not requested
1— American Indian or Alaska Native 3— Not applicable
2— Asian Action Taken:
3— Black or African American 1— Loan originated
4— Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 2— Application approved but not accepted
5— White 3— Application denied by financial institution
6— Information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or 4— Application withdrawn by applicant
        telephone application 5— File closed for incompleteness
7— Not applicable 6— Loan purchased by financial institution
8— No co-applicant 7—Preapproval request denied by
 Sex: financial institution
1— Male 8—Preapproval request approved but not accepted (optional)
2— Female High Risk Loan Code
3— Information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or 1— HOEPA loan
        telephone application 2— Not a HOEPA loan
4— Not applicable Lien Status
5— No co-applicant 1— Secured by a first lien
 Reasons for Denial (optional reporting) 2— Secured by a subordinate lien
1— Debt-to-income ratio 3— Not secured by a lien
2— Employment history 4— Not applicable (purchased loans)
3— Credit history Census Data
4— Collateral Minority Population %: percentage of minority population
5—Insufficient cash (downpayment, closing costs)         for census tract
6— Unverifiable information FFIEC Median Family Income: FFIEC Median family
7— Credit application incomplete         income in dollars for the MSA/MD in which the tract 
8— Mortgage insurance denied         is located (adjusted annually)
9— Other Tract to MSA/MD Median Family Income Percentage: 
 Type of Purchaser        of tract median family income compared to MSA/MD
0— Loan was not originated or was not sold in calendar year         median family income
        covered by register Number of Owner Occupied Units: Number of dwellings, 
1— Fannie Mae         including individual condominiums, that are lived in 
2— Ginnie Mae         by the owner
3— Freddie Mac Number of 1- to 4-Family units: Dwellings that are built 
4— Farmer Mac         to house fewer than 5 families
5— Private securitization Loan Amount (In Thousands of Dollars)
6— Commercial bank, savings bank or savings association Annual Percentage Rate (APR) Above High Cost Thresholds
7— Life insurance company, credit union, mortgage bank, 
        or finance company Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
8— Affiliate institution A Guide to HMDA Reporting: Getting It Right , January 1. 2013.
9— Other type of purchaser
